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The purpose of this thesis is to discuss existing U.S. arms sales to the Gulf
Cooperation Council states (GCC) and to propose an appropriate strategy for future arms
trades. The GCC states' existing strategy for acquiring weapon systems has not been
sufficient for the defense needs of the six countries. Each country has its own strategy
and its main arms source. The reduction of the GCC states' resources due to a gradual
reduction in oil price makes it necessary to consolidate their arms acquisition strategy to
reach an efficient strategy that serves future defense requirements. U.S. weapon systems
were discussed as one solution to obtaining state-of-art weapon systems with lower life
cycle cost. U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) is a good tool to facilitate the arms trades
between the U.S. and the GCC states. Direct offset was examined for future arms trades
that enforce the GCC self-reliance. The U.S. M1A2 tank sales to Saudia Arabia and
Kuwait were discussed as a case study to clarify proposals and recommendations. Lastly,
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the security assistance process between the
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) and the United States. The GCC
consists of Saudia Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
B. BACKGROUND
The significant oil reserves beneath the six Arabian Gulf states and the weakness
of their defense systems have caused the regional threats to their security to increase,
especially from Iraq and Iran. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait at the beginning of this
decade showed the inability of the six countries, individually or collectively under the
umbrella of the GCC states, to defend themselves. The military capability that the GCC
states could develop in the past did not match the enormous strategic importance of the
GCC states. The small population of all GCC states did not allow the formation of large
armies or other labor-intensive military structures to match the large populations and the
standing armies of Iraq and Iran.
In order to compensate for the lack of personnel, the GCC states have focused on
the acquisition of sophisticated, capital-intensive defensive weaponry from foreign
suppliers. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and China were the main military
suppliers to the Gulf states. However, the United States received the majority of those
sales, especially after the Gulf War.
In the era of defense budget reductions around the world, all countries attempt to
equip their forces with systems that have lower life cycle costs. In order to satisfy its
customers, the U.S. security assistance program must provide an efficient method to
produce needed systems from supporting U.S. manufacturers. Also, the six GCC states
must combine their resources to acquire effective and sophisticated systems that would
otherwise be unaffordable to any individual country. This cooperation would also ensure
systems interoperability and standardization between the six forces, improving the
defense of the region.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objective of this research is to examine, the existing security assistance
program between the U.S. and the GCC states. The efficiency of the program will be
analyzed and potential improvements identified that will benefit both the U.S. and the
GCC states.
An analysis of the M1A2 tank foreign military sales case to Saudia Arabia and
Kuwait will be made, and other alternatives to such cases will be examined. The analysis
will focus on those costs which can be eliminated or reduced in the future. Cost reduction
would encourage the participating countries to procure more systems and others to




What are the disadvantages of arms sales processes to the individual six GCC
states? How can the existing security assistance process be improved to minimize the
disadvantages in the future, under the GCC?
2. Subsidiary Questions
1. How could co-production and cooperation be implemented to improve the trade
relations between the U.S. and the GCC?
2. What are the possibilities for the GCC to be self-reliant in producing arms in the
future with the help of U.S.?
3. Do co-production and cooperation affect U.S. defense preparedness, especially in
critical zones like the Gulf region?
4. How will security assistance (and foreign military sales (FMS) as one of the most
preferable tools) reforms increase the level of foreign partnering in U.S. weapon
systems?
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following information
sources:
1. Conduct a literature search of books, magazine articles. Defense Acquisition
Deskbook, General Accounting Office reports, and other library information
resources.
2. Conduct interviews with the military attache in Kuwait embassy in Washington D.C.
3. Conduct interviews with an expert from General Dynamics that produces the M1A2
tank.
4. Evaluate the benefits and the pitfalls of the FMS strategies for all parties by using the
following methodology
a. Discuss the disadvantages of the current GCC states policy in acquiring their
arms.
b. Discuss the importance of unity among the six states and how this unity will
improve their weapon system procurement in the future.
c. Discuss different arms suppliers with the emphasis on the U.S. as the best
among them for the GCC states.
d. Discuss different security assistance programs with emphasis on FMS and
offsets between the U.S. and the GCC states.
e. Use the M1A2 FMS case as one example to clarify the idea. Life cycle cost is
used as the principal criteria to choose the required weapon system.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides an introduction to the security situation in the six GCC states,
the Gulf countries' expenditures to address threats, and the proportion of the U.S. weapon
exports to the six countries. Chapter II also lists some disadvantages of the GCC states'
strategy in acquiring their needs of arms.
Chapter III discusses the security assistance program and shows the preference of.
the foreign military sales in relative with the direct commercial sales. Chapter III also
discusses how foreign exports affect the defense industries. Lastly, the types of offsets
are discussed.
Chapter IV discusses the future GCC defense acquisition and how to obtain the
best weapon systems by performing the combination of foreign military sales with direct
offset. The chapter discusses the effect of the offset and co-production strategies on the
parties, especially the defense industries in the U.S.
The M1A2 Main Battle Tank FMS cases with Saudia Arabia and Kuwait are used
in Chapter V to emphasize the analysis.
Chapter IV (summary, conclusion, and recommendations) summarizes the findings
of the research and answers the research questions.

II. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND THE GCC
A. INTRODUCTION
The six Arab states of the Gulf have taken a variety of steps to enhance their
security. First, they banded together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a sensible
move that not only provides a little more force, manpower and financial resources for
defense purposes, but also makes considerable sense economically and culturally.
Second, led by Saudia Arabia's predominant size and financial resources, the GCC states
embarked on ambitious military modernization programs. These efforts cannot overcome
obvious constraints of small size and limited manpower but, nevertheless, will help these
countries to meet a myriad of lesser security threats. Third, the GCC states have worked
toward accommodation with more powerful and radical neighbors in the Gulf, as well as
elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East. They have also sought
friendship as well as economic and political cooperation with the U.S. and the West.
However, mindful of the lessons of the past, they have insisted that military cooperation
remain limited to an "over-the-horizon" role. Acquiring new weapon systems and signing
bilateral agreements with the U.S. and other Western countries will enhance the security
in the region and will help its stabilization.
B. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE ARAB GULF STATES
The six Arab monarchies of the Gulf share much in common. Their small
indigenous populations are predominantly Arab and Muslim. They are still tribal
societies, strongly traditional, with an emphasis on the family. Most of ruling families
emerged around the eighteenth century out of a tribal environment, and their leadership
continues to be highly legitimate in the eyes of nearly all nationals. Independence came
in 1961 for Kuwait and in 1971 for Bahrain. Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. While
the modern Kingdom of Saudia Arabia dates only from 1934 under that name, its Al
Sa'ud roots extend back several centuries. Oman has always been technically
independent.
The six countries share a common legacy of traditional economies, based on
pastoralism, pearling, and some fishing. Before oil, the decline of pearling and onset of
the world depression had rendered the six countries poverty stricken. The discovery of oil
in the decades between 1930 and 1970 was fortuitous, and their economies remain
dependent on oil revenues, as well as oil-based or oil-fueled industries.
Each of the individual Gulf states has different strategic needs and vulnerabilities.
Saudia Arabia is the largest of the Gulf states in terms of both geography and military
forces and is the key to any successful effort at regional cooperation in defense. Yet,
Saudia Arabia has a low ratio of forces for the space in its critical defensive areas,
particularly along its border with Iraq. It cannot create an effective defense without its
neighbors. [Ref.l: p. 16]
Kuwait shares a common border with Iraq and is only a short distance from Iran.
No foreseeable mix of Kuwait, Gulf countries, other Arab, or U.S. forces can offer
Kuwait full security against another round of Iraqi surprise attacks or surprise Iranian air,
amphibious, and missile attack. Kuwait's small territory and population keep its military
vulnerable, and the country also has massive oil and gas resources to protect. [Ref.l:
p. 16]
The other smaller Gulf states face more serious problems. They are spread along the
coast of the southern Gulf. If any of these states fell into hostile hands, it would be a
major strategic springboard for intervention by Iran or Iraq, or a constant threat to the
internal security of its neighbors. A hostile air force or navy, based in the Gulf states,
could also make it far more difficult for other Arab states or the U.S. to project power
into the region. [Ref.l : p. 16]
Iran presents different challenges. The waters of the Gulf provide a barrier to
Iranian land and amphibious attacks or the main territory of the other southern Gulf
states. At the same time, Iran's coast covers virtually all of the northern Gulf and extends
into the Gulf of Oman. The Gulf does not act as a barrier to strategic attacks, naval
attacks, infiltration, or arms smuggling. [Ref. 1 : p. 1 6]
Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Oman have unique problems. They do not share a
common border with Iran or Iraq, but they all lack strategic depth and adequate air
coastal defense capabilities and are vulnerable to Iraqi and Iranian attacks. Bahrain is
small and relatively poor. Qatar is small, and has too small a native population to develop
effective armed forces. The UAE shares the demographic and geographic problems of its
literal neighbors. Oman must defend the Straits of Hormuz against any challenge by Iran.
[Ref.l: p. 17]
C. COOPERATION WITHIN THE ARABIAN GULF STATES
The desire for a Gulf security pact dates back to the British withdrawal in 1971.
The December 1976 Gulf foreign ministers' conference in Muscat ended, predictably,
without agreement due to incompatibility of Iran and Iraq with the six smaller states. The
Arab states had long mistrusted Iran. Iraq was the only revolutionary state in the region
and, in times past, Iraq had actively sought to subvert its conservative neighbors.
Ironically, it took the outbreak of hostilities to clearly identify the threat to Gulf security.
The Iran-Iraq war provided the conditions necessary for the remaining six states to form a
security organization.
The six Arab monarchies had much in common, including basic similarities in
their political, economic and social systems. Most had maintained close ties for many
years, and bilateral relations were close with Britain and the U.S. With the temporary
removal of Iran or Iraq from inclusion, agreement on cooperation was assured. [Ref.2:
p.115]
Military coordination to meet an external threat is more difficult to achieve. Even
in combination, the GCC states are far smaller in total population, armed forces, and
industrial base than Iran or Iraq. The combined number of GCC military personnel is less
than 1 50,000. In contrast, Iraq has 600,000 men under arms while Iran totals over a half
million regular troops. More importantly, GCC military establishments are new and
untested. Arms acquisitions have skyrocketed in the last two decades, but trained
indigenous personnel required to operate them are in short supply.
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The GCC states made a start toward developing the cooperation defense
capabilities when they set up the GCC in 1981. The GCC has since made progress in the
form of common staff talks and limited numbers of common military exercises. It
established a token rapid deployment force in Hafr al-Batin, Saudia Arabia, and made
efforts to develop common procurement policies. [Ref.3: p. 10]
During the Gulf war, Oman proposed that the GCC states cooperate to create a
100,000 man GCC force, but found itself virtually isolated within the GCC. Saudia
Arabia pressed for a far less ambitious plan to upgrade the Peninsular Armored Force that
had existed before the war, but also received little real support. The resulting disputes
among the GCC states led to a situation where no substantive steps have been taken to
create more integrated or interoperable forces. [Ref.3: p.l 1]
In spite of all the risks exposed by the Gulf War, the GCC states still tend to
substitute rhetoric for military cooperation and serious planning. Discussion of military
standardization, common support facilities, and common military production facilities led
to far more words and studies than actions. [Ref.3: p. 12]
D. THE WEST'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GULF
The relationship between Western states, including the U.S., and the GCC states is
based on satisfaction of mutual interests. The West has been involved in the security of
the region for many years. However, oil was the primary attraction for the U.S., unlike
the imperial goals of Britain and France before it. As the British influence gradually
declined in the 1960's, the United States started to fill the vacuum that was created by
withdrawal of the British.
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Logically, as long as the GCC states are blessed with oil and Western economies
depend on this commodity, the West will always have interests in the region and will
usually try to reformulate a Desert Storm style of coalition if the region is threatened.
Additionally, the West has found an excellent market for their weapons in the Gulf
region. This can be seen as the "tax" that the GCC states have to pay to the West. [Ref.4:
p.77]
E. THE UNITED STATES AND THE GCC STATES
President Carter outlined his doctrine of the Arabian Gulf in the State of the Union
Address on January 23,1980:
Let our position be absolutely clear. An attempt by any outside force
to gain control of the Persian (Arabic) Gulf region will be regarded as
an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force.
This is a clear commitment from the U.S. to defend its vital interests in the region.
[Ref.5: p.3] The U.S. later assumed full responsibility to respond to any outside aggressor
on the GCC states by signing individual agreement between each of the GCC states and
the U.S.
Improvement in U.S.-GCC relations complemented the enhancement of U.S.
military capability. The strength and nature of U.S. relations differed with each GCC
state as a function of numerous factors such as domestic politics in regional states,
geopolitics, and intra-Arab politics. But in general, U.S. relations with the GCC have
improved immensely since 1960's. Desert Storm played an important role in this
evolution. After Desert Storm, the U.S.-Kuwait defense co-operation Agreement was
12
signed in September 1991 and provided for U.S. access to Kuwaiti military facilities,
prepositioning of defense material for U.S. forces, and joint exercises and training.
The U.S. also updated its access agreement with Oman and with Qatar and Bahrain.
Bahrain, which served since 1949 as host of the U.S.' small Middle East Force, renewed
its access and prepositioning agreement with Washington in October 1 99 1 . Qatar in turn
signed a twenty-year defense co-operation agreement on June 23, 1992, which also
allowed U.S. access and prepositioning. [Ref.5: pp. 104- 106]
While the U.S. commitment to Saudi security was long standing, Desert Storm
raised the U.S. commitment to the level of a security guarantee, absent written
formalities. Although the U.S. and Saudia Arabia have not signed a security agreement,
Saudia Arabia has agreed to proceed with existing arrangements that allow the U.S. to
use its air bases and ports and to coordinate training and military exercises. [Ref.7: p.68]
Security assistance programs and direct military sales were an important facet of
America's new defense strategy in the Arabian Gulf region. In the aftermath of Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration sought to use the opportunity to bolster U.S.
security assistance programs. The effort was made to address, regional imbalances, and
large security assistance programs were proposed which would concurrently address the
GCC's immediate needs during the Gulf crisis and, hopefully, establish a more favorable
balance of power in the Gulf region in the longer term. Secretary Baker told the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, "We would expect the states of the Gulf and regional
organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to take the lead in building a
reinforcing network ofnew and strengthened security ties." [Ref.8: p. 8]
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F. GULF COUNTRIES AND ARMS SALES
While the six Gulf states are loosely allied within the GCC, each state is dependent
on the strength of its own individual military capabilities and the power projection
capabilities of the U.S. and other Western states. Its efforts at unity are more rhetoric than
reality, and this is particularly true of its military effort. The GCC states have made only
limited progress towards developing effective economic and security arrangements. They
are deeply divided over how best to strengthen the role of the GCC in creating integrated
military forces, defense plans, and procurement efforts. [Ref.l: p.l] The following
paragraphs will summarize the total weapon systems exports to the individual GCC states
and identify the proportion of exports from the U.S.
1. Saudia Arabia
Saudia Arabia is the largest among the six countries dealing with the foreign
military sales. The relationship between the U.S. and Saudia Arabia started in the late
1950's. In 1962, following the Yemeni crises, Saudia Arabia first began to look seriously
at improving its armed forces. Wars in the Sinai only exacerbated the Saudia Arabian
Government's concerns over its military strength and regional stability. Revenue from
increased oil profit beginning in the early 1970s made it possible for Saudia Arabia to
finally start strengthening its armed forces. One of Saudia Arabia's largest buys involved
U.S. AWACS and F-15 fighter aircraft, making it the only foreign country to have both
of these aircraft in the force structure. [Ref.8: p.3]
All U.S. military sales to Saudia Arabia, as well as construction sales, are on a cash
basis. The vast majority of these sales are processed through the FMS system. Roughly
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one-quarter of all U.S. worldwide FMS sales have been to the Saudia Arabian
Government. Since 1950, these FMS sales to Saudia Arabia have totaled over $64 billion.
Saudia Arabia has also made almost $2 billion in direct commercial purchases of defense
articles and services from United States. [Ref.8: p.3]
Although Saudia Arabia has diversified its arms procurements from other sources,
it's clear that the U.S. remains the main source for Saudi procurement.
2. Kuwait
Kuwait has increased its imports from the U.S. since the Gulf War. It has often
made deliberate efforts to import from a wide variety of countries, emphasizing politics
over interoperability and standardization. Kuwait imported $2.04 billion worth of arms
during 1992-1994. A total of $1.8 billion came from the U.S., $1.00 million from France,
$30 million from other Middle Eastern countries, $80 million from other East European
countries, and $30 million from other countries. During 1981-1994, however, only about
half of Kuwait's arms came from the U.S. One purpose of the latest shift to U.S. systems
is to improve and standardize U.S. and Kuwaiti weapon interoperability. The two states
signed a 10-year, bilateral defense agreement in 1991. [Ref.l: p.25]
3. Bahrain
Bahrain is dependent on the U.S. for arms import. Bahrain imported $1.4 billion
worth of weapon systems during 1979-1994. It has spent less on arms imports during the
four years since the Gulf War than it did during the four years before it. Bahrain only
purchased $200 million in new arms during 1991-1994, all from the U.S. This total
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compares with $600 million worth of new arms sales agreements during 1987-1990, the
period before the Gulf War. Similarly, Bahrain took delivery on $300 million worth of
arms during 1991-1994, the period during and after the Gulf War, virtually all from the
U.S. It took delivery on $800 million worth of arms during 1987-1990. [Ref.ll: pp.56-
57]
Reporting by the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) shows that
Bahrain's annual arms imports from the U.S. have varied sharply by year. They did not
surge as a result of the Gulf War, but have risen significantly in the mid-1990s as the
result of Excess Defense Articles made available through the U.S. FY1995 and FY1996
security assistance programs. Bahrain obtains virtually all of its U.S. equipment through
the FMS program and rarely buys from commercial markets. [Ref.l : p.91]
4. Oman
The size of Oman's arms imports have varied sharply by year, although they have
consistently reflected the limit posed by Oman's economy. Oman's arms imports have
never exceeded $350 million per year, and this peak was reached in 1983, when the Iran-
Iraq War seemed most likely to threaten Oman in the form of Iranian pressure. [Ref.l:
p.171]
Oman imported a total of $1.6 billion worth of arms during the period 1979-1994.
The bulk of Oman's arms have come from Europe, many from Britain. Oman imported a
total of $565 million worth of arms during 1979-1983, with 80 million from France, $430
million from the UK, $10 million from Italy, $5 million from China, and $ 20 million
from other countries. [Ref.10: p. 134]
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Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) indicates that Oman imported a
total of $445 million worth of arms during 1985-1989, with $30 million coming from the
U.S., $200 million from the UK, $120 million coming from Germany, and $5 million
from other European countries. It indicates that Oman imported a total of only $180
million worth of arms during 1992-1994, with $20 million coming from the U.S., $150
million from the UK, $5 million from the Middle East, and $5 million coming from other
countries. [Ref.l 1: p.68]
Reporting by the DSAA shows that Oman has spent comparatively little on new
FMS agreements, although they ordered $67 million worth of FMS supplies in FY 1990.
U.S. FMS deliveries reached $42 million in FY 1991, but otherwise were under $10
million per year from FY1985-FY1995. Oman imported less than $10 million a year of
the U.S. arms between 1985-1995. [Ref.l 2: p.75]
5. Qatar
Qatar imported a total of $1.3 billion of worth of arms during the period 1979-1994.
Many of Qatar's arms have come from France, although Qatar has bought arms from a
wide range of countries. ACDA estimates that Qatar imported a total of $765 million
worth of arms during 1997-1983, with $10 million from the U.S., $440 million from
France, $310 million from the UK, and $5 million from other countries. [Ref.10: p. 134]
The data published by the DSAA shows that Qatar has never been a major
importer of U.S. military equipment and the country did not place significant new orders
as a result of the Gulf War. All U.S. sales to Qatar are cash transactions. [Ref.l : p.263]
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6. United Arab Emirates
The broad trends in UAE military expenditures reflect its response to the threat Iran
posed during the Iraq-Iran War followed by the threat Iraq posed during the Gulf War.
The UAE increased its annual military expenditures from around $822 million in 1987, to
$1.9-$2.1 billion from 1981 through 1985. Defense spending dropped to around $1.6
billion during 1986-1990, but climbed in 1991 in reaction to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait,
peaking to $4.9 billion. Military spending has since dropped to a little under $2 billion a
year. [Ref.l: p.346]
The UAE's total arms import during 1979-1983 totaled $620 million. Roughly $20
million came from the U.S., $350 million came from France, $90 million from the UK,
$110 million from Germany, $30 million from Italy, and $20 million from other
countries. [Ref.l: p.347] Total arms import for the UAE during 1984-1988 totaled $620
million, showed a shift towards imports from the U.S. Some $20 million came from
USSR; $350 million came from the U.S., $180 million from the UK, $70 million from
Germany, and $30 million from other countries. [Ref.14: Table III]
The UAE shifted back to dependence on European suppliers before the Gulf War.
ACDA estimates that the UAE signed a total of $2.17 billion worth of new arms
agreements during 1987-1991. With $20 million coming from Russia. $450 million from
the U.S., $1.4 billion from France, $5 million from the UK, $20 million from China, $90
million from West Germany, $60 million from other European countries, $90 million
from East Asian countries, $20 million from Middle Eastern countries, and $20 million
from other countries. [Ref.14: Table III]
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The UAE then shifted suppliers again after the Gulf War. ACDA estimates that the
UAE took delivery on a total of $995 million worth of new arms agreements during
1992-1994. With $260 million coming from Russia, $360 million from the U.S., $110
million from France, $10 million from other European countries, $5 million from Middle
Eastern countries, $30 million from East Asian countries, and $190 million from other
countries. [Ref.15: Table III]
Reporting by the DSAA shows that the delivery of past UAE arms orders was
accelerated during the Gulf War, and that the UAE signed significant new FMS sales
agreements as a result of the Gulf War. It ordered $492 million worth of arms in a
FY1992, $69 million worth in 1993, and $227 million worth in 1994. This was only a
limited portion of the UAE's total orders, however, and the UAE has placed
comparatively few orders for commercial sales from the U.S. All U.S. sales to the UAE
are cash transactions. [Ref.l: p.347]
G. PROBLEMS OF THE GCC STATES ARMS PROCUREMENT
Though the GCC states have purchased large numbers of weapons, there are
problems in the ways that the countries have acquired them: [Ref.l 6: p.l 1]
1. Emphasis on number of weapons and high prestige "glitter factor" buys of advanced
weapons and technologies.
2. Sub-optimization on minor military specifications or advanced technologies for key
weapons platforms over balanced and integrated arm buys.
3. National and service rivalries are given priority over standardization, integration, and
the creation of a regional deterrent and war fighting capability.
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4. Episodic "boom and bust" buys from different suppliers greatly complicate the
problems of force expansion and conversion.
5. Maneuver capabilities, sustainability and maintenance, recovery and repair, and
training are given far too little priority.
6. Cost analysis is lacking, or based on engineering cost estimates of procurement cost.
Realistic life-cost analysis is almost non-existent.
7. A lack of long-term force planning and procurement planning leads to recurring
efforts to over-expand force structures and equipment pools at a time when limited oil
revenues and growing civil spending burdens make such plans unsustainable.
8. A "buy it and they will come" approach to obtaining trained and effective manpower.
9. Tendency to mix advanced weapons designed for aggressive joint operations with
static tactical concepts divided by service and "stove piped" within individual
services.
10. Sale-oriented suppliers with little strategic concern for the end result in terms of
regional stability and deterrent/war fighting capability.
H. SUMMARY
The six Arabian Gulf countries are still exposed to threats from Iraq and Iran.
Because of the GCC, a threat to one member country is a threat to all six. The need for
cooperation between the six countries is necessary especially after facing the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait at the beginning of this decade. It is easy to join the Arabian Gulf
soldiers in one military because of similar culture, but interoperability will be difficult
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because of the wide variety of weapon systems acquired from the numerous suppliers
around the world.
Interoperability and standardization of weapon systems are vital issues in
combining many different military organizations. The GCC states must coordinate among
themselves before acquiring any new weapon system. The bilateral defense agreements
between each GCC states with the U.S. leads to more dependence on U.S. equipment.
The acquisition of weapon systems from one source will enhance the integration among
the six countries.
Although some of the GCC states have depended on non-U.S. weapons in the last
decade, sales to the six countries from the U.S. have increased especially after the Gulf
War. Considering recent trends, the six countries plan to acquire more U.S. system in
order to be more efficient. The success of the U.S. weapon systems in demand by the
GCC states is a signal that the U.S. needs efficient security assistance processes to satisfy
its security assistance customers. In the next Chapter, I will discuss the existing U.S.
security assistance process with the individual GCC states. The advantages and the





Security assistance is a tool to serve the U.S. interests. By helping allies and friends
to acquire and maintain the tools of war, the U.S. aids their self-defense. This assistance
has high priority, especially in regions of the world where U.S. has vested national
security concerns, such as the Arabian Gulf. Such help allows those countries to live in
stable political and economic environments.
In President Reagan's FY1988 budget submitted to Congress, he included the
general objectives and linkage between security assistance and U.S. foreign policy:
[Ref.l7:p.7]
For more than forty years, security assistance has been an essential
element of U.S. efforts to help build a more secure and peaceful
world. Successive administrations, backed by bipartisan support in
Congress, have recognized the indispensable role security assistance
plays in the successful conduct of global foreign and defense policies.
The U.S. commitment to an effective security assistance effort
reflects two fundamental tenets of U.S. post World War II approach
to national security and the protection of U.S. interest: a foreign
policy based on global engagement and collective security, and a
military strategy of deterrence and forward defense. Security
assistance is an essential instrument in the implementation and
integration of this twin pillars of our national policy. By helping
friends and allies to acquire the means to defend themselves, the
United States complements the rebuilding of its own military strength
and increases the human and material resources available for defense
of free world interests. [Ref.17: p. 8]
Where regional instability exists around the world, security assistance has been
used as a part to enhance the international relations. Whether motivated by economic
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gains, or through the realization that a particular combatant is preferable to the other,
security assistance attempts to establish and reinforce relationships that are beneficial to
the country providing the aid. [Ref.17: p.8]
B. HISTORY OF THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
The first significant security assistance legislation was enacted in 1946. It
authorized $20 million to train and equip the armed forces of the Philippines. In
exchange, the United States gained access to 23 air and naval bases in that country for 99
years. But 1947 marked the real beginning of the program. That year, President Truman
issued a dramatic announcement that U.S. arm and advisors would be sent to Greece and
Turkey to assist the resistance from communist insurgencies and threats. Toward this end,
Congress enacted the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947. [Ref.18: p.9]
Much more comprehensive legislation was passed in 1949. The Mutual Defense
Assistance Act was a security complement to the Marshall Plan's economic aid to
Western Europe. It created what was to become a central element of U.S. foreign aid, the
Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Mutual Defense Assistance Act provided a
statutory basis both tor military aid to the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization and for
cash Foreign Military Sales (FMS). It was followed by the Mutual Security Act of 1951,
which consolidated the authorization for military and economic aid into one statute and
established a Mutual Security Agency to administer the distribution of military and
economic assistance. By authorization, the disbursement of economic assistance was
made for the purpose of sustaining the military capabilities of friendly and allied nations.
This legislation also created an early basis for what was to become the Economic Support
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Fund (ESF) in fiscal year 1979. Moreover, the act consolidated several prior statutes
authorizing military aid to Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, Iran, and South Korea under
this one legal umbrella. [Ref.18: p.9]
Finally, in this early postwar period, the cornerstone of the Eisenhower
administration's aid program was the Mutual Security Act of 1954. This act repealed all
prior legislation. It authorized one of several foreigners to the ESF under the control of
the Defense Support Program. The intent was to channel to friendly countries the
commodities, services, and financial assistance designed to sustain military effort. The
act also authorized the FMS credit program and allowed the extension of security
assistance to U.S. alliance partners. [Ref.18: p.10]
In 1961, the entire foreign aid system was reorganized. Congress consolidated
major aids programs, including FMS, Military Assistance Program (MAP) and security
assistance for economic support, into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.The act created
the Agency for International Development (AID) and re-authorized peacekeeping
operations. For the first time, the 1961 act permitted the use of economic support funds
for political purposes (instead of solely for sustaining military capabilities). All security
assistance legislation since 1961 has been in the form of an amendment to the 1961
Foreign Assistance Act. As amended, the Foreign Assistance Act remains the principal
legal foundation for U.S. foreign aid, including security assistance. [Ref.18: p. 10]
The first major amendment to the 1961 legislation was the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968, which provided separate authorization for the FMS cash and FMS credit
programs. Congressional concern about the level and purpose of arms transfers was
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clearly manifested by the mid-1970s. The Foreign Assistance Act mandated a reduction
in the role of the U.S. government, in the furnishing of defense articles and defense
services to foreign countries, and a return to commercial channels. Foreign Aid
Legislation in 1974 forbade the use of security assistance to train police in foreign
countries. It also contained the Nelson Amendment, requiring that Congress be notified
before the president offered to sell defense articles or services worth $25 million or more.
Under this provision, Congress could, within 20 days of receiving such notification, pass
a concurrent resolution overriding the proposed sale unless the president declared that an
emergency existed. [Ref.18: p. 10]
Amid continuing concern about the utility of arms sales and military assistance
generally, Congress passed the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of
1976. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) again consolidated the laws governing U.S.
arms sales. It covered both cash and credit sales and sales by both the U.S. government
and private commercial contractors. The AECA separated the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program from the larger MAP program and mandated a
phase-out of the latter. Section 104 of the act also extended into the time under the
Nelson Amendment, in which Congress could disapprove an arms sale within 20 to 30
days. Finally, while allowing for exceptions, section 502(b) incorporated a strong human
rights provision. [Ref 1 8: p. 1 0]
The AECA represented a sweeping revision of those articles of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 governing arms transfers, and it superseded, outright, the Foreign
Military Sales Act. However, while there is considerable sentiment for changing the
26
present statutory framework, the Foreign Assistance Act and the AECA continue to guide
the security program. Despite calls for wide-ranging reform during the Bush and first
Clinton administrations, the program was revised only marginally. [Ref.18: p.l 1]
In early 1994, the Clinton Administration submitted to Congress a draft to replace
the Foreign Assistance Act, cited as H.R.3765, "the peace, prosperity, and democracy act
of 1994." The importance of alliances and coalitions remains evident given the language
in Sections 3301 and 3302 of the bill: [Ref.19: p.9]
In order to stem incipient regional conflicts worldwide, the United
States sees great value in maintaining alliances, coalitions and other
cooperative defense relationships that permit more effective
collective defense efforts. The United States will provide assistance
to enhance the ability of countries worldwide willing to share the
burden of contributing to regional alliances, coalition operations, and
other collective security efforts to counter threats to and maintain
international peace and security. [Ref. 20: p.54]
The pursuit of interoperability of weaponry is fast becoming the Clinton
administration's most prevalent rationale for continuing widespread arms exports.
Interoperability is a hallmark of coalition warfare, which the United States built up during
the Cold War. [Ref.21:p.5]
C. SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION
The transfer of military assistance to eligible foreign countries under authorizing
legislation is called security assistance.
1. Security assistance is defined as, "a group of programs which authorize the United
States to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related
services, by grant and by credit or cash sales, in furtherance of U.S. national policies
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and objectives." These programs are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended.
2. The term security assistance is comprehensive and encompasses support in the form
of design and development, acquisition, storage, transportation, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. It includes the provision of
whether the logistics support is rendered on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.
3. A variety of means is employed in planning, developing, and administering security
assistance support to eligible countries. Current legislation continues to grant to the
President the general authority for providing security assistance. It authorizes him to
acquire defense articles and services from any source and to provide this support by
grant, loan, or sale. The actual provision of defense materiel, services, and training is
administered under one of the following security assistance programs: [Ref.22: p. 121]
• Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction Sales
Program
• Foreign Military Financing Program
• Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licensed under the AECA
• Military Assistance Program (MAP)
• International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
• Economic Support Fund
• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
For the purpose of this research, the following components will be defined as
follows: [Ref. 17: p. 15]
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
FMS is a non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign governments
purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States Government. The
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purchasing government pays all costs that may be associated with a sale. In essence, there
is a signed government-to-government agreement, normally documented on a Letter of
Request (LOR) and Acceptance (LOA) between the U.S. Government and a foreign
government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a "case" and is an assigned a unique
case identifier for accounting purposes. Under FMS, military articles and services,
including training, may be provided from DoD stocks or from new procurement. If the
source of supply is new procurement, on the basis of having a LOA which has been
accepted by the foreign government, the U.S. Government agency or military department
assigned cognizance for this case is authorized to enter into a subsequent contractual
arrangement with the U.S. industry in order to provide the article or service requested.
[Ref.22:p.41]
2. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licensed under the AECA
A commercial sale licensed under the AECA is a sale made by U.S. industry
directly to a foreign buyer. Unlike procedures employed for FMS, the commercial sale
transaction is not administrated by DoD and does not involve a government-to-
government agreement. The U.S. Government control procedure is accomplished through
licensing by the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State. Day-to-day rules and
procedures for these types of sales are in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR). [Ref.22: p.43]
With few exceptions, such as sales, which directly affect DoD production
schedules or U.S. security, the U.S. is neutral concerning country acquisition of articles
or services under FMS or through direct commercial contracts. DoD restricts release of
29
data, which competes with U.S. private firms. The role of the U.S. Government in direct
commercial contracts is normally limited to export controls. [Ref.17: p.8]
In general, government-to-government purchase agreements tend to ensure
standardization with items in use by U.S. forces, provide contract administration services
which may not be readily available otherwise, and help lower costs by consolidating FMS
buys with U.S. purchases. Commercial purchases allow the purchaser more direct
interface during contract negotiation, may use firm-fixed prices, and may have a better
capability to tailor the items to a particular need. [Ref.17: p.9]
D. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
The U.S. security assistance program was created by U.S. public law. While the
administration of security assistance is vested in the Executive Branch, the Congress, by
virtue of Article 1, Section I of the U.S. Constitution (which gives it all legislative
power), exerts influence in several ways: [Ref.19: p. 16]
1. Development, consideration and action on legislation to establish or amend basic
security assistance authorization acts.
2. Enactment of appropriation acts.
3. Passage of joint resolutions in the form of a Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA)
to permit the incurrence of obligations to carry on essential security assistance
program activities until appropriation action is complete.
4. Hearings and investigations into special areas of interest, to include instructions to the
General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and
Congressional Research Service (CRS) to accomplish special reviews.
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5. Ratification of treaties, which may have security assistance implications.
Additionally, Congress is assigned power by Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations, while Article IV, Section 3
indicates that the "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States."
Congress performs these responsibilities through its committees of both Houses of
Congress. The primary committees of Congress involved with security assistance
legislation are: [Ref.17: p. 17]
1. Authorizations:
• House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Committee on
Foreign Affairs
• Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Relations
2. Appropriations
• House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittees on
Foreign Operations .and Defense).
• Senate Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittees on Foreign Operations
and Defense).
The Executive Branch's organizational structure is far more diverse. The
management of security assistance encompasses the Department of States, Treasury,
Commerce, Defense, the Unified Commanders and the military departments. The
Department of Treasury and Commerce exercise authority over security assistance
programs through their control measures to include export clearance and critical
commodity controls. The key players, however, are the State Department and DoD.
Figure 1 provides a depiction of the U.S. Government organization for security
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Figure 1 . Security Assistance Organizational Structure
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E. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS
The focus of the security assistance program with any country is the cohesion of
the U.S. and the foreign purchaser's policy objectives. Any assistance provided by the
U.S. must not only strengthen the recipient country's objectives, but also more
importantly, strengthen U.S. national security and promote world peace. The
commonality of objectives represents the first litmus test potential foreign military sales
must pass. Based on the nature of the request, the military department having cognizance
over the defense article or service will normally receive a Letter of Request (LOR) from
the foreign country through U.S. diplomatic channels. Figure 2 shows the channel for
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Figure 2. Channel for Submissions ofLORs
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Once the military department has received the LOR, the request must be validated
to ensure that the potential customer is an eligible FMS recipient, that the article or
service sought may be sold and that the request has been received through proper
channels. The DSAA maintains a Military Articles and Services List (MASL) which
identifies the military articles and service eligible for FMS. If the item requested is not on
the MASL, a policy level decision must be made.
Provided the LOR has cleared the initial screening, the military department will
draft a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) which will in turn be reviewed by the
DSAA and initial approval provided by the Department of State. During the Department
of State's review of the LOA, Congress can also be notified of the impending sale.
Although not a statutory requirement, it provides Congress with a 20-calendar day
advance notification to allow for preliminary congressional examination. Once the 20
days period has expired, DSAA submits the formal 30-day notification to Congress
required by the Arms Export Control Act. The onus is upon Congress to act if it objects
to the LOA. If Congress fails to object to the proposed sale within 30 days, the DSAA
submits the LOA to the requesting government for its review and acceptance/rejection.
The means by which the U.S. Government. fulfills its obligations of the FMS
programs vary according to the article or service requested. In the instance of military
articles, the requested item can be provided from military surplus or government stocks.
For procurement items from new production, the FMS requirements may be consolidated
with DoD requirements or contracted separately. [Ref.21 : pp.2 1-22]
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F. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
Congress plays a powerful role in U.S. security assistance by providing funding,
writing laws and attaching restrictive language to funding. Most terms and conditions of
letters of offer and acceptance (LOA), the basic contract documents of FMS agreements,
come directly from language in the AECA. According to this act, the Executive Branch
must notify Congress of all sales over $50 million and all sales of major defense
equipment (MDE) over $14 million. This notification (referred to as a 36b notification
after the section of the law requiring it) is formally forwarded to the Congress 30 days
before the LOA is offered in the case of a Persian (Arabian) Gulf country. (Most Third
World nations are under the same regulation). DSAA also forwards an informal classified
notice 20 days before the formal notice. Thus, Congress has 50 days to consider a major
sale. [Ref.23:p.l59]
The vast majority of cases go through the congressional notification process
without comment. The Middle East/Arabian Gulf region, however, is an area containing
more than its share of controversy. The U.S. Congress cited the four objectives held by
all U.S. presidents since World War II. One of these objectives, the security of Israel, has
presented the Executive Branch with a seemingly intractable series of problems for
security assistance relations with other nations in the region. Generally, both Houses of
Congress have been extremely wary of the sales of lethal technology to Arab nations that
have not signed a formal peace treaty with Israel. In recent times, "contributions to the
Peace Process" serves as a measure to determine whether or not Arab nations may be sold
additional military hardware. [Ref.23: p. 159]
G. ARMS TRANSFER AS STABILIZERS
According to its new conventional arms transfer policy, the Clinton Administration
believes U.S. arms exports promote regional stability by creating balances of power and
building up the deterrent capabilities of U.S. friends and allies. Undoubtedly, the ability
to create regional balances is facilitated by the fact that the United States is arming both
sides in many cases. [Ref.19: p.6]
Whether weapons maintain peace and security or undermine them will never be
proven. However, given the high degree of geopolitical flux today, predicting regime
stability and the steadfastness of alliances is speculation at best. A bill pending in
Congress would attempt to keep the U.S. from making potentially disastrous exports by
identifying characteristics of less stable governments. Under the so-called "Code of
Conduct" legislation, the four conditions a country must meet to be eligible for U.S.
weapons are: a democratic form of government; respect for the basic human rights of its
citizens; non-aggression against other states; and full participation in the United Nations
Register of Conventional Arms. The president may exempt a country, which fails to meet
these criteria. [Ref.19: p.6]
H. MORE BENEFITS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Since it was implemented as a U.S. strategy for foreign policy, security assistance
has served the U.S. and its allies as well. We can summarize those benefits as follow:
1. As the lone military superpower and a world leader, the U.S. is committed to
maintaining strong allies who share common military equipment, doctrine, and
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capabilities. This policy is articulated in the U.S. security strategy, which states that:
[Ref.l9:p.l2]
Through training programs, combined exercises, military contacts,
interoperability and shared defense with potential coalition partners,
as well as security assistance programs that include judicious foreign
military sales, we can strengthen the self-defense capabilities of our
friends and allies.
2. The sale of equipment to eligible countries gives the U.S. the opportunity to access
and influence within the recipient countries and their respective regions. Also, the
U.S. defense industry receives some limited business through the sales of support
equipment, logistical support, training and upgrade kits. [Ref.19: p. 12]
3. Another benefit of security assistance program is the reduction in the overseas
presence of U.S. forces. Once armed with state-of-art military equipment and
training, U.S. allies and partners are more capable of holding an adversary in place
while the U.S. deploys its forces to the crisis area. Additionally, common military and
support equipment within a host country greatly reduces the strategic lift requirement
of the U.S. in the early days of a crisis. This de facto forward presence assists in
protecting U.S. vital interests abroad as the military reduces its force structure.
[Ref.19: p. 16]
4. U.S. officials say sales foster good relations with other military forces, enable those
countries to defend themselves better, and reduce the price of U.S. weapons by
spreading the cost over bigger production runs. A key element of the national security
strategy of engagement and enlargement is to bolster America's economic
revitalization. This effort is "premised on a belief that the line between the U.S.
37
domestic and foreign policies has increasingly disappeared, that the U.S. must
revitalize its economy if it is to sustain its military forces, foreign initiatives and
global influences, and that the U.S. must engage actively abroad if we are to open
foreign markets and create jobs for the American people." Shortly after President
Clinton took office, the State Department told U.S. embassies to push arms deals as if
they were agricultural or pharmaceutical exports. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown
told U.S. weapons makers in 1993: [Ref 19: p. 17]
We will work with you to help you find buyers for your products in
the world marketplace, and then we will help you close the deal.
That early direction is now formalized as the U.S. conventional arms transfer
policy.
I. FOREIGN EXPORT AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Since the beginning of the defense down-sizing, the U.S. has cancelled or curtailed
many of its own procurement initiatives, forcing defense industries to lay off workers,
while others abandon the defense business altogether. Several major defense contractors
have taken advantage of government funding to make the transition from defense
products to commercial products, while others have consolidated to remain viable.
General Dynamics sold its fighter aircraft division to Lockheed; Northrop bought out the
financially strapped Grumman Aircraft; and Lockheed' and Martin-Marietta have merged.
Boeing has merged with McDonnell-Douglas. These are significant events, since these
mergers and conglomerates greatly reduce the number of vendors qualified to produce
aircraft, especially fighter aircraft, for the Department of Defense. As the production base
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grows smaller, the competition becomes less, eventually resulting in an overall increase
in price for the purchaser, due to simple supply and demand economics. [Ref.19: p. 18]
To maintain the U.S. technological superiority, many feel that the critical skills in
the defense industrial base must be preserved. Since the U.S. is not buying, defense
industries must sell overseas to maintain technical know-how and jobs. Former Secretary
of Defense William Perry outlined seven initiatives to maintain the U.S. defense
industrial base and those critical skills. In one of his initiatives he said: "The government
will assist U.S. companies in exporting their products across the world." The
Government's new conventional arms transfer policy specifically addresses this point. In
addition, the DoD can once again directly support international air shows on behalf of
U.S. defense contractors. [Ref.24: p.22]
The reality today is that many U.S. weapons now in production, including most
state-of-the-art F-15 and F-16 fighters, M1A2 tanks, AH-64 helicopter gun and ships, are
bound for foreign customers, not the Pentagon. Presently, there are only two major
defense contractors producing fighter aircraft in the U.S.: Lockheed and Boeing/
McDonnell-Douglas. Foreign military sales are the only sales keeping these two
contractors in the fighter business. The same case applies to the M1A2 tank; General
Dynamics had been producing the tank just for Saudia Arabia and Kuwait during the
period 1993-1994. Since those production lines are still working, the Opportunity exists
for the DoD to restart new production without exorbitant start-up costs. [Ref.19: p.21]
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Keeping multiple defense contractors solvent and selling new production equipment
over less modern equipment to the U.S. partners and allies is important to the U.S. for
several reasons: [Ref.19: p.22]
1. The first is competition. Multiple contractors encourage competition, which in turn
yields the lowest price for an item. The other aspect of competition is from
international defense contractors. The U.S. partners and allies want and need modern
equipment. If they don't get it from the U.S., they will get it from somewhere else.
2. The second reason is for economies-of-scale contracting, or spreading the cost over
bigger production runs. The more you buy, the less each item costs.
3. The third reason is the compatibility and burden sharing. Common equipment
between the U.S. and its allies allows them to work hand-in-hand without being
totally dependent on any one state. In addition, commonality allows the U.S. and
other allied nations, to travel to the crisis area faster and lighter. It is not necessary to
show up with a lot of support equipment or spare parts, since the host country has an
established supply and repair system for common systems.
J. OFFSET
An offset is defined as the agreement between a foreign country and U.S. defense
company, which is in contrast to the traditional foreign government to U.S. Government
relationship associated with FMS. The seller is compelled by the buyer to enter into a
compensating or reciprocal relationship. This condition is referred to as counter-trade for
civilian goods, but when the sale is of a military nature, offset is the accepted term.
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An offset is a range of industrial or commercial compensations required as a
condition of purchase in either government to government or commercial sales of defense
article and/or defense services as defined by the Arm Export Control Act (AECA) and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The different types of offsets are:
[Ref.23:p.26]
1. Co-production. Overseas production based upon a government-to-government
agreement that permits a foreign government or producer(s) to acquire the technical
information to manufacture all or part of an U.S. origin defense article.
2. Licensed Production. Overseas production of an U.S. origin defense article based on
transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrangement between an
U.S. manufacturer and a foreign government or producer.
3. Subcontractor production. Overseas production of a part or components of an U.S.
origin defense article.
4. Overseas investment. Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the form
of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign
country.
5. Technology Transfer. Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset
agreement which may take the form of research and development conducted abroad,
technical assistance or other activities under direct commercial agreement between
the U.S. manufacturer and a foreign entity.
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6. Counter trade. An agreement involving the reciprocal purchase of civil or defense
goods and services from the foreign entity as a condition of sale of military-related
export.
7. Counter-purchase. An agreement by the initial export to buy (or find a buyer for) a
specified value of unrelated goods from the original importer during a specified time
period.
8. Compensation. An agreement by the original export to accept as full or partial
repayment goods derived from the original exported product (e.g., turnkey factory,
machinery or equipment used to produce military articles). Agreements for repayment
in related goods are often referred to as "buy-backs." [Refl7: p.26]
Within the arms industry, offsets associated with military exports are frequently
divided into direct and indirect classes: [Ref.22: p.409]
1. Direct Offsets. A form of compensation to a purchaser involving goods which are
directly related to the item being purchased. As an example, as a condition of U.S.
sale (FMS or DSC) to foreign purchaser, the U.S. contractor may agree to permit the
purchaser to produce in its country certain components or subsystems of the weapon
system the country is purchasing. Normally, direct offsets must be effected within a
specified period. [Ref.22: p.409]
2. Indirect Offsets. A form of compensation to a purchaser involving goods which are
unrelated to the item being purchased. As an example, as a condition of U.S. sales
(FMS or DSC), the contractor may agree to purchase certain of customer country's
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manufactured product, agricultural commodities, raw materials, or services. Indirect
offset may be accomplished over an extended, open-ended period. [Ref.22: p.409]
K. OFFSETS AND APPLICATIONS
In the 1950s, in addition to supplying the European and Japanese militaries with the
U.S. equipment, the U.S. started to rebuild its allies' arms industries through licensed
production and co-development of weapon systems. In 1970s, as the allies began to
shoulder more of the cost, they began to exact a fee for access to their markets. Offset
agreements allowed buyers to tell their citizens about all the non-defense advantages they
got when they purchased weapons from abroad: new technologies, jobs, investment, a
foothold in a new market. Camouflaging top-dollar weapons purchases with side deals
"makes the monetary outlays on military equipment appear lower than they actually are
and therefore more acceptable to both politicians and the public," according to OMB.
[Ref.23:p.2]
Prime contractors have been willing to play along. With offset agreements, their
products can be sold at high prices. The real losers are the subcontractors who lose
business to producer in recipient countries, and companies in unrelated industries who
must compete with the foreign items defense contractors agree to sell in the U.S.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, many developing nations began to follow the
industrialized countries' lead and routinely required that some raw percentages of their
arms purchase be reinvested in their own economies through offsets. Some Congressional
observers describe today's offsets as a massive foreign aid program being run by defense
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contractors. Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, UAE, South Korea and Turkey have established
offset "guidelines" for arms imports. [Ref.23: p2]
L. OFFSET POLICY IN THE GCC STATES
The types of offsets required by a country depend on its program goals, its
economy, and whether it is developed, newly industrialized, or less industrialized.
Companies undertake a broad array of activities to meet these offset obligations.
A country's offset requirement policy outlines the types of offset projects sought by
that country. These requirements include the amount of offset required (expressed as a
percentage of the purchase price); what projects are eligible for offset credit; how these
projects are valued (e.g., offering multipliers for calculating credit for highly desired
projects); nonperformance penalties; and performance periods.
Countries with less industrialized economies, such as Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, and
the UAE, generally pursue indirect offsets to help create profitable businesses and build
their country's infrastructure. These countries usually do not pursue direct offsets because
they have limited defense and other advanced technology industries. [Ref.24: p.4]
1. Kuwait
In 1992, Kuwait began requiring offsets for all defense purchases over $3 million.
Kuwait pursues offsets that will generate wealth and stimulate the local economy through
joint ventures and other investments in the country's infrastructure.
The Kuwaiti Government calls for U.S. contractors to propose investment projects,
and then manage and design the projects selected by the Kuwaiti Government. The
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agreements required offsets equal to 30 percent of the contract values as stated in
Kuwait's offset policy. U.S. companies have had limited experience with Kuwait's offset
program to date, but generally consider it manageable. [Ref.24: p.23]
2. Saudia Arabia
Saudia Arabia has intermittently required offsets since the mid-1980s. Officials at
one company observed that Saudia Arabia has recently pursued "best effort" agreements
with U.S. defense contractors, rather than formal offset agreements. Saudia Arabia uses
its offset policy to broaden its economic base and provide employment and investment
opportunities for its citizens.
The offset agreements are informal with no set offset percentage, although officials
at one company estimated their arrangement was equivalent to a 35 percent offset
agreement. The agreements include a requirement that companies enter into joint
ventures with local companies to implement offset activities. The offset activities consist
of defense and non-defense-related projects. In some instances, the offset projects include
local production of parts or components for the weapon system being purchased.
However, these represent small portions of the overall offset projects. The Saudia
government agreed to pay price differentials to make Saudia manufacturers price
competitive. The agreements do not include explicit multipliers, but some agreements
grant credits for technology transfers at the cost Saudia Arabia would have incurred to
develop the technology.
Companies commented that Saudia Arabia wants to establish strategic partnerships
and long-term relationships with its suppliers and that the Saudia government has been
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fairly flexible in negotiating offset agreements. The following is an example of offset
agreement between Saudia Arabia and different U.S. industries:
• General Dynamics and McDonnell-Douglas contracted with companies in
Saudia Arabia to satisfy offset obligations from several weapons sales. In one
case, a Saudia firm will manufacture circuit boards for tanks, while in another
instance, a Saudia company will manufacture components for F-15 fighter
aircraft. (Countertrade Outlook, Vol. XIII, No. 6, Mar. 27, 1995, p. 5.)
[Ref.24: pp.32-34]
3. United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates first instituted its offset policy in 1990. In 1993, it issued
new requirements granting offset credit only for the profits generated by offset projects.
The policy requires a 60 percent offset on all contracts valued at $10 million or more.
The United Arab Emirates uses offsets to generate wealth and diversify its economy by
establishing profitable business ventures between foreign contractors and local
entrepreneurs.
The United Arab Emirates is interested in a wide range of non-defense-related
offset projects. Company officials generally questioned the feasibility of the United Arab
Emirates' current offset requirements. They said only a small number of viable
investment opportunities exist and such projects take several years to generate profits.
The following are some offset agreements between the UAE and different industries:
• The agreements with the United Arab Emirates required that 60 percent of the
sale be offset through non-defense-related investment projects and granted
multipliers for various types of investment projects.
• Several French firms have established manufacturing facilities or other
investments in the United Arab Emirates to satisfy offset obligations. For
example, Thomson-CSF started a garment manufacturing enterprise in Abu
Dhabi in connection with a contract for tactical transceivers and audio
systems. Giat Industries created an engineering company specializing in air
conditioning as part of its offset commitment for the United Arab Emirates'
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purchase of battle tanks. (Countertrade Outlook, Vol. XIII, No. 8, Apr. 24,
1995,pp.3-4.)
• McDonnell-Douglas Helicopter Company entered into several joint ventures
with firms in the United Arab Emirates to satisfy offset commitments for the
sale of AH-64 Apache helicopters. Projects included forming a company to
manufacture a product that cleans up oil spills and creating another firm that
will recycle used photocopier and laser computer printer cartridges. The
defense contractor is also paying for an U.S. law firm to draft the country's
environmental laws. (Countertrade Outlook, Vol. XIII, No. 2, Jan. 23, 1995,
pp. 2-3.)
• The United Arab Emirates is working with Chase Manhattan to establish an
offshore investment fund to provide international contractors doing business
in the country the opportunity to satisfy part of their offset obligations.
(Countertrade Outlook, Vol. XIII, No. 2, Jan. 23, 1995, p. 1.) [Ref.24: pp.34-
35]
From the previous review, the following points can summarize the offset
agreements between the GCC states and different defense industries:
1
.
The three main countries that have practiced offsets are Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and
UAE. Those three countries have led the. other three countries, Bahrain, Oman, and
Qatar, in the arms trade.
2. The offset projects sought by the three countries have been limited to civilian sector
except for Saudia Arabia, in some instances. Saudia Arabia has started manufacturing
some parts for tanks and fighters.
3. It is well known that Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE have problems with native
labor availability/capability to operate the proposed industry. The three countries
have rejected some proposals from different defense industries because it requires
foreign laborers to work in those projects. However, Bahrain and Oman have
sufficient labor to operate such proposed firms. Unfortunately, the coordination
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between the six countries in this field is weak. Also, the facilities to initiate specific
industries in some GCC states are better than others.
M. SUMMARY
This chapter started with the history of the U.S. security assistance from the
beginning until today. It has shown the evolution of the security assistance objectives and
how they relate to the U.S. national security objectives. Then, the chapter illustrated how
countries can acquire military equipment and services through the procedure of the
security assistance by different methods. Some of the benefits, either to the U.S. or its
allies, of the security assistance are then listed. As the defense procurement decreases
around the world, this will definitely affect the defense industry in the U.S. This chapter
discussed the impact of resulting defense downsizing on the defense industry. Offset is
defined with its different types of applications and the offset policy in some GCC states
has discussed. However, the security assistance program, with its extensive application
and history, has some disadvantages that have made valuable customers to complain on
its implementation. The next chapter will deal with some of those problems from the
GCC states perspective, and how the security assistance program process and implication
could be improved to attract those countries and others to buy more weapon from the
U.S.
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IV. FUTURE GCC DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The slump in oil prices will probably hit hardest the military procurement
agreement programs of the six GCC states. Kuwait, Saudia Arabia and the UAE, which
have for decades depended on U.S., UK and French equipment, are again facing
shortages in funds after the recent collapse in oil prices. This occurred just as they were
coming out of the economic difficulties they experienced after the earlier oil price falls
and the $60 billion cost of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Therefore, major military orders will
probably be halted until the economic situation improves.
Along with economic collapse in Asia, on which Gulf oil producers have
increasingly focused their export, the GCC states' difficulties present manifold problems
for defense contractors. The pending contracts with GCC members include: [Ref. 27:
P-30]
• A Saudia Arabian requirement for up to 100 advanced fighters' aircraft,
possibly F-16Ds, to replace its aging F-5s, and 350 to 400 more U.S. M1A2
MBT.
• Up to 80 advanced combat aircraft for the UAE worth as much as $6 billion
• A complete command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) worth
around $1 .2 billion for Kuwait.
The GCC states, of course, still rely on the U.S. and its allies to protect them from
any future threats. While this is unlikely to end in the near future, the relationship
between the U.S. and the six GCC states is somewhat more fragile than it was. With the
existing threats from Iran and Iraq, the GCC must look for a solution other than
dependence on their Gulf War allies. When oil is depleted, or its price decreased, the U.S.
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and the West will not have the same interest to fight for that resource, but Iran will still
have its intent to annex the small states in the Gulf. Iran's greed is not focused on getting
the Gulf oil, but rather to expand its revolution to include its neighbors. Iraq still has the
power to invade Kuwait, maintaining a potential capability of over 2,500 tanks, 4,400
armored vehicles, 1,000 artillery pieces, 120 attack helicopters, and 300 aircraft, which is
sufficient to re-invade Kuwait and Saudia Arabia. Iraq may be waiting for the opportunity
to take revenge on the Gulf states, which helped the U.S. to destroy its power after the
Gulf War. [Ref.27: p.32]
The big lesson to be learned from the Gulf War is that the six GCC states cannot,
with their current military organization, defend themselves from any aggression from
either Iraq or Iran. The future military strategy for the six countries must be based on
building a permanent force that combines the existing six forces into one cohesive
military unit. They must ensure their security through building their own collective
defense, enhancing and developing the military capabilities of the existing Peninsula
Shield Force established in 1985. This will not only ensure immediate military response
but will provide a much-needed deterrent to potential aggressors.
B. BUILDING A COLLECTIVE FORCE
The effectiveness of any military force depends on two key issues: manpower and
arms. For the purpose of this research, only the arms side will be discussed. The type of
weapon to be procured is very important for countries with low populations, like those of
the GCC states. In order to compensate for the low population, technologically advanced
weapons must be acquired. These types of weapons are expensive to acquire and
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maintain. Therefore, any procurement must be efficient, especially in the era of low oil
prices. In this case, efficiency means to consolidate the acquisition of the six countries in
a system that fulfills the mission with lower costs. [Ref.28: p. 12]
Most GCC states need to stop making political and "glitter factor" procurements.
They need to steadily increase their number of common suppliers for major weapons
types. The GCC states need to focus on procuring interoperable, standardized equipment
which would provide the capability to perform the following missions: [Ref.28: p. 13]
1. Heavy armor, artillery, attack helicopters, and mobile air defense equipment for
defense of the upper Gulf
2. Interoperable and standardization with U.S. power projection force
3. Interoperable offensive air capability with stand-off, all-weather precision weapons
and anti-armor/anti-ship capability
4. Interoperability air defense equipment, including heavy surface-air missiles, beyond-
visual-range/all-weather fighters, airborne early warning and surveillance capability,
anti-radiation missile and electronic countermeasures capability
C. PRIMARY FOREIGN ARMS SOURCES
From 1 990 onward, the Third World arms market has been comprised of three
general tiers of suppliers. In the first tier is the United States, whose positions far surpass
that of any other arms suppliers to the Third World. In the second tier are France, the
United Kingdom and Russia. Their positions are notably below that of the U.S., but
distinctly above the positions of the remaining arms suppliers to the Third World. The
four nations in the first two tiers have historically had the means to supply the most
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advanced weapon systems to the Third World in quantity and on a continuing basis. But
as the competition for a declining Third World arms market increases, the European
suppliers may have difficulty sustaining the market shares they held in past. On the third
tier are China, other European suppliers, and other non-European suppliers, countries that
have generally been marginal or sporadic participants in the Third World arms trade. The
names of countries in this third tier are likely to change over time, especially at its lower
end, since some of these nations lack the means to be major suppliers of advanced
military equipment on a sustained basis. Some of them, however, are capable of having
an impact on potential conflicts within Third World regions because of their willingness
to supply weapons based almost exclusively on commercial considerations, including
types of weapons that other suppliers would refuse to provide.
While this thesis focused on the U.S. to GCC arms trade, the U.S. is by no means
the only source for effective weapon systems. In the following paragraphs, the primary
weapons suppliers will be reviewed as some of the possible competitors for producing
weapons to the GCC (Extracted from an unclassified report of conventional arms transfer
to developing nations as published by Library of Congress on 13 August 1997): [Ref.29:
pp.48-51]
1. Russia
Due to domestic economic problems it has encountered in recent years, as well as
the Cold War's end, Russia has terminated its grant military assistance program with most
of its arms clients in the Third World. At the same time, Russia has sought arms deals
with countries such as Iran that can pay for weapons in hard currency. These
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developments, and Russia's loss of Iraq as a major arms purchaser, are major factors that
explain why the overall values of Russia arms transfer agreement have dropped
significantly most recently.
Yet, Russia has confronted significant difficulties in making profits from
conventional weapons. Most of Russia's previous arms customers are either under
sanctions or too poor to invest in weaponry. The majority of potential cash-paying arms
purchasers have been long-standing customers of the U.S. or major European suppliers.
Even in an era of heightened competition, these nations are not likely to replace their
weapons inventories with unfamiliar, non-Western armaments when newer versions of
existing equipment are readily available from traditional suppliers. Some of Russia's
former arms clients in the developing world continue to express interest in obtaining
additional weapons from Russia, but have been restricted by a lack of funds to pay for
armaments. Russia's difficult transition from the state-supported and controlled industrial
model of the former Soviet Union has also led some prospective arms customers to
question whether Russian defense contractors can be reliable suppliers of spare parts and
support services needed to maintain weapons systems they sell.
Nonetheless, Russia has made significant efforts to gain arms agreements with
developing nations that can pay cash for their purchases. The figures since 1 993 suggest
that Russia has had some recent success in cash-based transactions. In the post-Cold War
era, Russia's principal arms clients have been China and Iran. Russia has also made
smaller arms deals with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for armored fighting
vehicles and Malaysia for MiG-29 fighter aircraft. Iran, primarily due to its own
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economic problems, recently has ceased to be a major purchaser of arms from Russia. At
the turn of the decade, Iran was a primary purchaser of Russian armaments, receiving
such items as MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter-bombers, T-72 tanks, and Kilo class
attack submarines.
In 1996, Russia's most notable arms deal was with India. Russia sold this traditional
client 40 new Su-30 fighter aircraft, which made India the developing nation with the
largest arms agreement total for that year. Russia has continued to maintain a relationship
with a more recently acquired arms client, China. This arm supplying relationship with
China began maturing in 1994. By 1996, Russia had sold China at least 72 Su-27 fighter
aircraft, as well as four Kilo class attack submarines. A licensing agreement had also
been finalized between Russia and China, permitting China to co-produce as many as 200
Su-27 aircraft [Ref.29: p.49]
2. Major West European suppliers
The four major West European suppliers are France, United Kingdom, Germany
and Italy. The group registered a decrease in its collective share of all arms transfer
agreements with developing nations between 1995 and 1996. This group's share fell from
23.1 percent in 1995 to about 18.1 percent in 1996. The collective value of this group's
arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 1996 was $3.5 billion, compared
with a total of nearly $4 billion in 1995. Of these four, the United Kingdom was the
principal supplier with $1.8 billion in agreements, increasing from $409 million in 1995.
France registered a notable decline in arms agreements from $2.5 billion in 1995 to $1.3
billion in 1996. Italy also registered a decline from over $800 million in 1995 to $300
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million in 1996. In 1995, Germany's agreements with developing nations were over $300
million, but in 1996 had fallen to $100 million.
As a group, the major West European suppliers averaged 21.9 percent of all arms
transfer agreements with developing nations during the period from 1989-1996. Since the
end of the Cold War, the major West European suppliers have generally maintained a
notable share of arms transfer agreements. For the 1993-1996 period, they collectively
averaged 28.4 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations. Individual
suppliers within the major West European group have had notable years for arms
agreements, such as France in 1992, 1993, and 1994 ($6.7 billion, $4.1 billion, and $8.4
billion respectively), and the United Kingdom in 1993 ($2.6 billion). Such totals reflected
the conclusion of a few large arms contracts with one or more major purchasers in a
given year.
The competitiveness of weapons produced by these major West European
suppliers is enhanced by historically strong government marketing support for foreign
arms sales. Because they can produce both advanced and basic air, ground, and naval
weapons systems, the four major West European suppliers have proven quite capable of
competing successfully with the U.S. and Russia for arms sales contracts with developing
nations. Yet, with a shrinking global marketplace for conventional weapons, individual
West European suppliers may find it more difficult to secure large new arms contracts
with developing nations than in the past. Consequently, some of these suppliers may
choose not to compete for sales of some weapons categories, reducing or eliminating
some categories now produced. In an effort to maintain elements of their defense
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industrial base they may seek joint production ventures with other key European weapons
suppliers. [Ref.29: p50]
3. China
China emerged as important arms supplier to developing nations in the 1980's,
primarily due to arms agreements made with both combatants in the Iran-Iraq war. The
value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations peaked in 1990 at $2.6
billion. After 1990, the value of these agreements averaged about $550 million annually.
The 1 996 value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations was $500
million. Meanwhile, China has become a major purchaser of arms, primarily from Russia.
For the immediate future, China does not appear likely to be a major supplier in
the international arms market. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, few clients with
financial resources sought China's military equipment. Much of China's weaponry is less
advanced and sophisticated than weaponry available from Western suppliers and Russia.
During the 1980's, China sold and delivered CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistics
Missiles (IRBM) to Saudia Arabia, and Silkworm anti-shipping missiles to Iran. Other
anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles were sold by China to a variety purchasers
in developing countries. Reports persist in various publications that China has sold M-l 1
surface-to-surface missiles to a long-standing arms client, Pakistan. Iran and Syria have
also reportedly received Chinese missile technology. Such reports call into question
China's willingness to abide by its commitment to the restriction on missile transfers set
out in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). With a need for hard currency
and a product (missiles) that some developing nations would like to obtain. China may
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pose an important problem for those seeking to stem proliferation of advanced
conventional weapons into volatile areas of the developing world. [Ref.29: p.49]
4. United States
The U.S. has became the principal arms suppliers to most regions of the Third
World for the last two decades. The reputation of American weapons was enhanced by
their overwhelming success on the Gulf War battlefield. As a result, several Near Eastern
countries have sought to purchase advanced U.S. weapons systems in the period since the
war.
Further, because of the reduction in defense procurement in the United States
resulting after the end of the Cold War, American arms producers focused greater
attention on foreign military sales contracts to compensate for lost domestic orders. U.S.
weapons systems have traditionally been built first for the American armed services, with
only secondary consideration being given to foreign sales. As a result, these arms are
more advanced, complex, and costly than those of most other suppliers of arms to the
Third World.
Aggressive promotion of foreign purchases of American weapons has not been the
traditional policy of the U.S. government. The U.S. government, through various means,
has controlled and restricted transfers of U.S. weaponry to the Third World. But, as the
sales record in the period since the Kuwait crisis of August 1990 demonstrates, the U.S.
will make major sales of advanced arms to friendly Third World states whenever it
believes that U.S. national interests will be advanced by doing so. The Bush
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Administration did support an unsuccessful initiative to permit the export-import bank to
guarantee some loans for U.S. foreign military sales.
The following table shows the trend in U.S. new arms agreement to the developing
nations relative to other top exporters during the period of 1989-1996. [Ref.30: p.20]
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
US 8,540 19,005 12,890 14,175 15,857 6,949 4,097 7,285
Russia 14,137 12,559 6,727 1,539 1,388 3,755 5,625 3,900
China 1,692 2,582 673 550 543 834 205 500
France 1,329 2,934 3,251 6,708 4,057 8,449 2,454 1,300
UK 1,087 1,643 336 1,979 2,562 730 409 1,800
Germany 483 469 1,682 220 641 307 100
Italy 362 352 112 550 320 209 818 300
Other
European
3,504 1,408 1,233 990 320 1,147 920 900
All others 2,054 2,230 1,121 1,430 1,068 730 2,454 3,300
US share 26% 44% 46% 50% 59% 30% 24% 38%
Table 1 . Arms Agreement to the Developing Nations
D. THE GCC AND ARMS SALES
The GCC states are considered the biggest arms customers for the last two decades.
This phenomenon might continue until the six countries trust their defense system to
counter any existing threats. A study conducted by the Office of Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) in 1994 showed the percentages of conventional
arms to the Gulf states, led by Saudia Arabia. The study forecasted the worldwide arms
trade deliveries from 1994 through 2000. The following charts depict the percentages of
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arms import by each region in the world. The Middle East and East Asia have the highest
percentage (30%) as shown in Chart A (Fig.3). From the Middle East, among the Gulf
countries, Saudia Arabia gets 51%, UAE gets 13%, and Kuwait gets 8% with total of
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Figure 3. The Percentages of Arms Import
The report further mentioned that Saudia Arabia will remain the world's largest
arms importer and is expected to acquire an estimated $32.4 billion in military equipment
during the remainder of this decade. Procurements will include advanced fighter aircraft;
major ground arms, and support equipment and systems. An additional $13 billion in
arms are expected to be delivered to other members of the GCC. [Ref.3 1: p. 101]
The following table shows the arms import in $million (from 1987-1996) to the










Kuwait 8,600 1,600 100 3,300 500 500
Oman 100 1,400 100 100
Qatar 4,300
Saudia 47,800 200 3,300 42,200 2,500 200
UAE 1,400 800 7,500 400 700
Total 59,200 2,600 4,400 58,700 3,500 1,500
Table 2. The Arms Import in $Million (from 1987-1996) to the GCC Countries
The table depicts how U.S. weapon exports have played a major role in arming the
six GCC countries. Also, it shows that the main competitors for the U.S. are the West
European countries, which include U.K., France, Germany, and Italy. But, if the West
European category were further detailed according to each country, then the number
would not show any competition between the U.S. and each of the four major European
countries. The table excludes the FMS construction agreement between the U.S. and
Saudia Arabia and Kuwait. The FMS construction agreements during the same period
were $1,584 billion with Saudia Arabia [Ref.32: p.20] and $150 million with Kuwait.
[Ref.3 p!8]
E. ARMS SALES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE GCC
The above data shows the importance of U.S. security assistance to the GCC
states, especially Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE. Nevertheless, this dependency might
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decrease at any time because of the uncertain and competitive environment. The U.K.,
Germany, and Russia strive to increase their share in the arms market. They have tried to
increase their weapon quality to reach the performance level of similar American weapon
types, with lower cost. Recently, the GCC states have compared some American weapon
systems with similar West European systems and they prefer the American system.
However, as they accept U.S. systems because of their precedence in many criteria, the
GCC states have suffered some problems with the security assistance program that
administers the sales. Those problems are not limited to the GCC states but to all
participants. Some problem areas are: [Ref.36: p.2]
1 . Administration surcharge. A standard three-percent surcharge on all Foreign Military
Sales costs customers millions of dollars. The administration transactions for all FMS
cases are the same, regardless of the price of the deal. Whoever buys with the highest
dollar amount will pay more administration cost than others paying lower prices,
while the administrative transactions are approximately the same. The following table
shows the relation between the administration surcharge with total cases in each year
from 1991 to 1996. Although the FMS cases (and the administration surcharge as
well) has grown about 1 9 percent while the number of open cases has dropped about
16 percent. [Ref. 36: p.53]
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FY Value of FMS cases
(in billion)
NO. of open cases Admin. Surcharge (in
billion)
1991 $185,211 18,308 $5,556
1992 $196,276 18,190 $5,888
1993 $221,809 17,481 $6,654
1994 $226,174 16,645 $6,785
1995 $224,016 15,916 $6,720
1996 $219,926 15,209 $6,597
Table 3. Growth of Administration Surcharge and Number ofFMS Open Cases
2. It takes an onerous amount of time for the DSAA to close out the account. That is
because, in most cases, the U.S. government must wait to reconcile literally thousands
of supply and financial transactions that could involve dozens of nations that have
purchased similar items.
3. Customers now want to be viewed as partners, with more involvement in the entire
process, rather than the restricted roles of customers or aid recipients. Requests to the
Pentagon from FMS customers are not currently handled with responsiveness.
4. The bureaucratic "red tape", lax management and a reluctance to adapt to market
demands have been to choke the FMS program.
Nevertheless, the security assistance program has enough reasons to continue
performing as before. Charles Brown, who retired in 1990 as DSAA director after seven
years in security assistance management, said: [Ref. 35: p.34]
We have got to remember that security assistance is a foreign policy
tool and we must balance the political, policy and military-to-military
elements with the economic imperative in a way that the program
remains valuable to the U.S. government as well as the FMS
customers.
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However, Pentagon officials have begun to see the writing on the wall and in their
ledger book. Robert Bauerlein, U.S. Air Force deputy under secretary for international
affairs, said:
It is incumbent upon us to improve and streamline and make the FMS
system more businesslike. Otherwise, we will see a significant
diminution. In the amount of government-to-government cases, and if
we lose that element of the government-to-government relationship,
it will be a tragedy.
As an alternative to the FMS, some countries have switched to the Direct
Commercial Sales. Figure 4 compares the two programs by depicting the advantages and
disadvantages of both programs. [Ref. 34: p.35]
F. COOPERATION AND OFFSET
With declining defense budgets, cooperation between the different nations and
U.S. is becoming paramount. During the Cold War, as a consequence of Warsaw pact
cooperation, good cooperation existed between the U.S. and the Western European
countries under NATO. The cooperation has expanded to include Third World countries.
Cooperation between the U.S. and Egypt to produce the M1A2 tank is a good example.
The hardware of the MlA2 tank is manufactured in the U.S. and shipped to Egypt as kits.
Systems are assembled in Egypt by the local work force, with American defense
contractors providing training and technical assistance.
Defense Secretary Cohen, in a new policy memorandum on international
armaments cooperation, directs early commitment to international programs. Secretary




• Total package approached based
on U.S. military experience
• Proven U.S. military-qualified
logistic support
• Military-to-military interaction
in planning, deployment concepts,
training, doctrine, etc.
• Economies of scale because of
U.S. government bulk
procurements
• Minimal opportunities for U.S.
? military upgrade and changes
DCS
• Potential for fixed delivery or
fixed price, with penalty if
contractor falls
• Ability to negotiate terms and
conditions of contract
• More capability to tailor
package to unique country needs
• New equipment guaranteed
directly from production line
• Offset provisions can be
included in one contract
• FMS surcharges not included
FMS
• Customer receives only best
estimate on cost, which is usually
inflate.
• Customers cannot negotiate
directly with supplier nor
determine specific items of supply
• Government has broad latitude
to change, delay or terminate
contract without penalty
• Customers has no legal recourse
against Government
• Customer risks protected
deliveries
• Customers cannot close its
account with the U.S. government
until the government say so
• Customer often ends up paying
more for standard military item.
DCS
• Required more program
management by purchasing country
• Requires better negotiation
skills on part of purchasing country
• May not be standard with U.S.
military inventory
• Contractor can merge, go out of
business or otherwise
inconvenience customers
Figure 4. Comparison Between FMS and DCS
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In the evolving environment of coalition warfare, limited resources,
and a global industrial and technology base, it is DoD policy that we
utilize international armaments cooperation to the maximum extent
feasible, consistent with sound business practices.
It is DoD policy to deploy and support standardized or interoperable equipment
with U.S. allies and to leverage the U.S. resources through international cooperative
R&D, development, production, and logistics support program. Secretary Cohen has
directed that: [Ref.36: p.24]
• We engage Allies in discussions at the earliest practical stages to identify
common mission problems, and to arrive jointly at acceptable mission
performance requirements.
• We will designate appropriate defense acquisition programs as international
cooperative programs, noting that DoD must be a reliable international partner
by funding fully the U.S. share of such programs.
• In support of designated international cooperative programs, DoD will give
favorable consideration to transfers of defense articles, services, and
technology consistent with national security interests, laws, policies, and
international agreements.
G. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND OFFSET
Based on preceding information, GCC states should always pursue offsets with
FMS agreements. They must direct their effort to get the best from the U.S. security
assistance. FMS and offsets (co-production) have a lot of advantages that can be utilized
in order to acquire economical weapon system from the Unites States. The FMS
guarantees the interoperability, standardization and supportability between each of the six
countries within the GCC, and with the U.S. military as a defense alliance. Co-production
can overcome some of disadvantages that arise from FMS and also benefit the six
countries in the long run. Offsets can be utilized as an initiation for the co-production.
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H. CO-PRODUCTION WITH THE GCC
Armament co-production between the GCC states and the U.S. Government has
been minimal during the long history of the U.S. security assistance program. Such
cooperative efforts would encourage more arms trade with the U.S. However, co-
production should not be limited only to the industrial countries. Some Third World
countries possess the necessary industrial resources, money, labor, materials and power
sources to manufacture their own weaponry, yet lack of experience prevents such efforts.
The experience of the industrial countries is necessary to assist the Third World
countries, such as those of GCC, to start and develop a defense industry. Since the 1980's,
Saudia Arabia has initiated some light defense industry by manufacturing light munitions
and small weapons.
By cooperating to produce certain weapon systems, the GCC and the U.S. will
benefit in the following ways:
1
.
The equipment and weapons acquired from various sources by the GCC states have
been modified to be suitable for the Arabian Gulf circumstances. In any future
combat in the Gulf, the U.S. and the Gulf states will have similar weaponry, which
leads to more interoperability and standardization between the two forces, without
modification. Involving the Gulf states at the beginning of any program will produce
a weapon that can function in the desert environment efficiently.
2. If the GCC states could exploit the current healthy investment environment for
producing weapon systems, then those countries would help initiate their defense
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industry. This step would enhance the future economy for the six countries when the
oil is depleted.
3. The cooperation through co-production between the U.S. and the GCC states will
enhance the cooperation among the six GCC states in both economical and military
fields.
4. Co-production would attract those Gulf states, which have depended on West Europe
as main sources for their arms. Qatar and to some extent, UAE, have depended
mostly on West European sources.
5. If the defense industries through co-production will produce spare parts, then it will
be in a closely located source to supply that local theater, in the case of any combat
similar to the Gulf War. The U.S. forces faced significant of problems during the Gulf
War with the spare parts. Establishing a warehouse facility to supply spare parts
would ease the problem.
6. Co-production will result in a sharing of the overall cost for the weapon systems
among the participants.
I. EARLY COOPERATION AND CO-PRODUCTION
One of the primary reasons for international cooperation is cost reduction. By
effectively sharing costs, each of the participating countries can obtain high-tech
weaponry at a lower price. For this to be effective, costs must be adequately divided
among the participants. [Ref.37: p. 8] The mission needs statement for all participants
should be matched to produce a weapon that serves their individual and combined
national securities. As the U.S. interests continue in the Arabian Gulf area, there are
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common national securities needs between the U.S. and the GCC states. Although the
U.S. interest in the Gulf might decrease, the possibility of conflict in the Gulf remains
high.
The GCC states accept most of U.S. weaponry systems with some minor
modifications. Those weapons comply with the arms needs of the GCC states after some
minor modifications. However, the U.S. burdened the total weapon cost through its
acquisition cycle. If the R&D efforts include the customer requirements at the beginning
of any program, then the allied country should be responsible financially. As a
consequence, participants in the long run will get a relatively lower cost, more efficient,
and more effective weapon. The coordination between the GCC states and the U.S. to
initiate cooperation between them is necessary, particularly at this crucial era of declining
defense budgets. Co-production is a type of cooperation, which has a lot of benefits for
not just the Gulf states, but also for U.S. defense industries. Cooperation by production
between the GCC and the U.S. should start at the beginning of any new program, which
would improve the common national securities for both parties. The M1A2 tank, for
example, is an appropriate program to implement such cooperation. The case of the
M1A2 tank will be discussed later as a tool for cooperation between the GCC states and
the U.S. Offset is considered one of the most effective instruments to enforce the
cooperation between countries.
J. DSAA AND FUTURE RELATION WITH ITS CUSTOMERS
The GCC states are very important to the U.S. national security. The relation
between the U.S. and the GCC states is dependent on many issues; arms export is one of
68
them. The DSAA is the agency, which has taken the responsibility to facilitate the trade
procedures since it was established. The main purpose of this agency is to satisfy its
customers, including different countries around the world and the U.S. defense industries,
and to fulfill the U.S. national security goals. The track that the DSAA is following now
does not comply with the changing world environment.
In an interview with the DISAM journal, the Deputy Director of the DSAA, Mr. H.
Diehl McKalip said: [Ref. 38: pp.85-86]
Today, the FMS program is outdated, inefficient, and woefully ill
equipped to respond to customer needs or contemporary market
conditions. Declining markets, increased administrative costs, and
heightened customer expectation combines to challenge the very
continuation of the FMS program. We first need to examine whether
we should continue the government-to-government transfer of
defense articles and services on the same scale as in the past. If
answer is in the affirmative, then we need to determine how FMS
should be different from commercial sales, how we achieve a '
reasonable degree of customer satisfaction, and how we will pay to
administer the program. This examination will question the historical
premises and the statutory bases for what we do. But, it must be done
in the next few years".
K. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the current situation of the GCC states. The
consequence of decreasing oil prices and the need of the GCC states for high-tech arms to
counter the future regional threats have led to the combination of all the six Arabian Gulf
forces in a collective effort.
The chapter then compared the arms suppliers available to the GCC states,
including the U.S. The U.S. has different security assistance channels and the GCC states
and other countries can chose the best among them. However, those programs have
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advantages and disadvantages. The U.S. must modernize those programs in order to
attract more customers, especially in the post Cold-War era.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), Offset (co-
production) are available U.S. programs for the GCC states to use for acquiring their
needs of arms and also to initiate local defense industries. The coordination among the
six countries is required to reach the optimal benefit from U.S. security assistance
program.
70
V. GCC ARMS SOURCING ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide an analysis of FMS techniques and strategies using the
U.S. M1A2 Main Battle Tank sales to various GCC states for comparison purposes. The
FMS analysis is based on the background presented in earlier chapters and focuses on
achieving optimal, effective weapon systems that provide the required interoperability,
improve GCC self defense, promote GCC self-reliance, and maximize GCC defense
funding through the lowest possible life cycle, cost.
B. M1A2 MAIN BATTLE TANK
1. Introduction
The M1A2 main battle tank is the latest product-improved version of the U.S.
Army's premier ground combat system. This tank entered service in the early 1 980s, the
first successful U.S. tank development program since the late 1950s. It represented a
dramatic advance over the M60 series tanks which, throughout the 1960s and 70s, had
been seriously overmatched by threat vehicles like the Soviet T-64 and T-72. Although
durable, lethal and battle-proven in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, the M60 was
vulnerable to antitank guided missiles (ATGM) including those carried by infantrymen,
as well as conventional tank and antitank gun kinetic energy ,(KE) threats. [Ref.40: p.l 1]
During the Ml Abrams development, the predominant design priority was crew
survivability. The design countered the threat by providing significant improvements in
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armor protection, crew survivability, fire control, and mobility. Special armor was its
most significant single enhancement. The armor was effective against both KE and
chemical energy (CE) rounds and provided excellent protection against many threats
directed fire weapons at various angles and ranges. Throughout the program, the
development of the armor package has proceeded apart from the tank itself. Later
incremental improvements in armor and suspension were added to the last few vehicles
of the Ml production run, which became known as the improved Ml. [Ref.40: pp.12]
The first major vehicle block product upgrade, the M1A1, added a more powerful
weapon system (The 120 mm M256 smoothbore cannon), further improved the armor
package, added on-board positive pressure NBC system, and included a more durable
track. The M1A1, produced in greater quantities than any other variant of the Ml series,
equips the majority of the fielded U.S. armor and armored cavalry units.
The second major block product upgrade, designated the M1A2, represents a
significant technological shift. It incorporates a massive investment in digitization in its
on-board systems, all aimed at improving the reliability, fight ability, and operational
capability of the tank. Reliability is improved through the use of integrated circuits and
greater reliance on built-in diagnostic capabilities. Operations and fight ability are
enhanced through advances in battle management, fire control, survivability,
maintainability, and supportability. [Ref.39: p. 12]
2. U.S. Production
Abrams production originally occurred at the Lima Army Tank Plan; with over
9,000 Abrams having rolled off the assembly lines of this facility, including those
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produced for domestic and foreign sales. Currently, General Dynamics Land System
(GDLS) is under a multi-year Army contract to upgrade approximately 600 M1/IPM1
tanks to Ml A2. The plan will upgrade 10 tanks a month, over a five-year period. The cost
of a new M1A2 tank is approximately $4.3 million. [Ref.39: p. 8] The table below shows
the number of Ml tank in U.S. and their situation: [Ref.41 : p.2]
Configuration Number Description
Ml/IPM 3,141
The IPM1 is the improved version of the basic Ml. The IPM1
has an extended turret, increased capacity shock absorbers, and
added armor
M1A1 4,351
The M 1A 1 has.a larger gun ( 1 20mm) than the M 1 ; nuclear,
biological, and chemical over pressure system; and additional
armor protection
M1A2 87
The M 1 A2, an enhanced version of the M 1A 1 , has depleted
uranium armor, digital electronics, an improved commander's
weapon station, a positioning navigation system, a commander's
independent thermal viewer, an inter-vehicular information
system, a radio interface unit, and a commander's integrated
display.
Total 7,579
Table 4 Ml Tank Production
3. The Mi's in Desert Storm
Of 1,956 MlAls in the theater of operations, none were destroyed, four were
disabled and four were damaged but repairable. At least seven Abrams tank crews
reported taking direct hits from Iraqi T72 125 mm main guns and suffered no serious
damage. Their shells simply could not penetrate the Abrams tanks. Against
overwhelming odds, American soldiers and Marines using M1A1 tanks dominated the
battlefield. United States Marines reservists in a single engagement used Abrams tanks
for the first time (13 tanks) and destroyed 34 of 35 Iraqi tanks. In fact, during four
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engagements in four days, they stopped 59 Iraqi tanks (30 of them the top-line Soviet T-
72) without losing a single American tank. After 1 00 hours of offensive operations, the
Abrams tanks had operational readiness rate over 90 percent. Especially noteworthy was
a night move of more than 300 U.S. Army tanks covering 120 miles, without a single
breakdown. [Ref.42: p. 12]
In a briefing session on the MlAl's performance at the 1991 Armor Conference
held in May, a 1 st Armor Division officer attributed the low causalities in the ground war
to successful target engagement at long standoff distances. "We acquired targets at 4,000
meters, and had lots of kills at 3,000 meters," he said. "But I would say that the
preponderance of our kills were beyond 3,000 meters. That's why our casualties were as
low as they were." [Ref.43: p.25]
The Abrams tank exhibited good reliability during the Gulf War. The reliability is
measured in terms of operational readiness rates-the percentage of mission-capable
vehicles on a given day. Operational readiness rates reported during the Gulf War were
based on whether the vehicle could move, shoot, and communicate. [Ref.44: p.21]
The Gulf War experience showed the capabilities of the M 1 Tank. Weapon
exhibition is important for both arms buyer and seller, and that was demonstrated
perfectly during Desert Storm. Following the success of the M 1 tanks, Saudia Arabia and
Kuwait ranked this tank as the first tank to efficiently operate in the Gulf-like
environment. The War Theater consisted of around 30 allied-forces, and it was the perfect
environment to show the capabilities of weapon systems. It was real war, real targets, and
real weapon movement through real unexpected terrain. Desert Storm did not
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demonstrate the Ml tank alone. Weapons such as the Patriot Missile and others were also
examined and advertised to the world.
4. The problems of the M1A2 in the Gulf environment
a. Gas Turbine Engine: In the Arabian Gulf area, the Abrams tank engine faced
an extreme desert environment, which affected, operational planning and
caused concerns over sand ingestion. The Abrams tank's 1,500-hp gas turbine
engine requires extensive air intake to perform optimally. The tank's air
filtration system is adequate for conditions normally found in Europe and the
U.S., including the Army's National Training Central located in the California
desert. In the Arabian Gulf area, however, the tank's air filtration system
required frequent cleaning because of the fine talc-like desert sand.
According to the tank's crew, fine sand was thrown up into the air by the
tank's tracks and accumulated on top of the tank's air intake vent, which is
located on the rear deck. The sand then clogged the system air filters. There was
reduction of the airflow to the engine that caused a loss of engine power and
speed. In extreme cases, sand passed through the filtration system and damaged
the engine.
The Army had taken the extreme desert environment into consideration in
deploying armored units to the Arabian Gulf area, and it stressed the need for
frequent and intensive maintenance of the air filtration systems. Despite these
early warnings, problems with the sand ingestion began to appear soon after
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deployment, and more than 16 engine losses were encountered due to sand
ingestion. [Ref.44: p.28]
b. Weapon Ability to Distinguish Targets: Crew and commanders reported that
greater magnification and clarity are needed for the Abrams sights. The
Abrams tank gunners use primary sights with 3-power and 10-power
magnification. It has a thermal capability that allowed crews to see in dark,
smoky, and hazy conditions. Crews and commanders stated that improved
vehicles optics are necessary since experience in the Gulf War showed that the
Abrams was able to see and hit targets at greater ranges than it was able to
positively identify targets. Although Abrams gunners were able to see
potential targets out to 4,000 meters or more, the images were no more than
thermal "hot spots." Crews were generally unable to distinguish between
friendly and enemy vehicles beyond 1,500 to 2,000 meters under clear
conditions and as close as 500 to 600 meters or less during rainy conditions.
However, the vehicles' main weapon could hit enemy targets well beyond this
range, as the range of the Abrams 120-mm gun is 3,000 meters or more.
[Ref.44: p.29]
There are some lessons that can be derived from the tank failures in some
functions due to the Gulf environment:
1. The Ml was designed to stand against the T-72 Soviet tank, which was distributed all
around the world. Iraq is one of the T-72 owners who might threaten the U.S.
interests in the Arabian Gulf region. It is not only the high temperature that
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distinguished the Gulf desert from others, but also the tiny dust particles, which are
the main enemy to equipment. Dust might completely or partially halt the vehicle if it
is not considered up front in the design. However, this can be recovered later by
applying some modification to the vehicle, which, as a consequence, will increase the
weapon unit cost.
2. If the primary FMS customers, like Saudia Arabia, are included in the mission needs
statement development, then those deficiencies would not appear at critical events
like Desert Storm. Saudia Arabia knows its environment better than others and might
have more needs, since the real Desert Storm did not cover the four-season
environment.
C. MlA2 AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
There were three alternative main battle tanks to the GCC states to acquire, the
UK's Challenged tank, the French Leclerc, and the Ml tank. In the Gulf War, the three
tanks were used by their original manufacturing countries. Saudia Arabia and Kuwait
chose the M1A2. UAE chose to buy the French Leclerc, while Oman acquired the UK
Challenged.
1. Ml series tank
The Mi's technology and tactical success in Desert Storm made the tank the envy
of the world armor community and generated foreign interest. Both Saudia Arabia and
Kuwait now own M1A2 tanks produced at Lima Army Tank Plan (LATP). In a co-
production program, M1A1 tank kit (hulls, turrets, components, etc.) are manufactured at
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LAPT and shipped to Egypt for final assembly. Commercially, General Dynamics Land
System (GDLS) also produces special armor packages for the South Korean Kl tank.
Foreign military sales are listed below: [Ref.40: p. 8]
Country Quantity Product Dates
Saudia Arabia 315M1A2 1993-1995
Kuwait 218M1A2 1994-1996
Egypt 555M1A1 1991-1995
Table 5. Ml Tank Owned by Other Countries
Saudia Arabia pays around $1.8 billion, while Kuwait received 218 tanks with a
price around $1.2 billion (unit cost equal around $5 million)[Ref.45], without the FMS
cost. The total price of the FMS for both countries are as follow:
Saudia Arabia Kuwait
Unit Cost $5 $5
Quantity 315M1A2 218M1A2
Cost (million) $1,575 $1,090
Admin. Charge 3% $47.25 $32.7
Crating & Handling 4.5 % $70,875 $49.05
Contract Admin. 1.5 % $23,625 $16.35
Agreement Total Price $1716.75 $1188.1
* All Prices Are in Million
Table 6. Cost of Foreign Military Sales
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2. The UK Challenged MBT (Desert version)
The British Challenger is being upgraded as the Challenged. It adds an improved
thermal sight (the thermal observation and gunnery was notoriously unreliable during the
Gulf War), and a more sophisticated commander's station with hunter-killer capabilities
in daytime, and access to the new thermal sight, which has fewer parts and has been
repositioned. In addition, the new Challenger has a more sophisticated fire control
system, incorporating an improved version of the digital computer used in M1A1 and
with growth potential to include position/navigation gear to link it to command and
control networks like IVIS or the British battlefield information control system. [Ref.46:
P-34]
Oman bought 20 tanks of the Challenged, manufactured by Vickers Defense
System, worth over $ 1 63 million. [Ref.46] The total quantity of Challenged tank have
been produced until now is depicted in the following table: [Ref.45]
Country Quantity Comment
Oman 20
These have a number of modifications to suit operation in the
Middle East, especially maintaining full engine power of 1,200
hp in temperatures up to +50C. The delivery 1995.
UK 386 First delivery 1994
UK 420
Challenger 1
Delivered in mid- 1 990
Table 7. Countries Own Challenged Tank and Quantities
3. The French Leclerc MBT
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the dominance of the MlA2 could come from
the French Leclerc, which may be the most sophisticated tank and the newest design in
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production outside the U.S. All it lacks, among major components, is an independent
viewer for the tank commander. And its armor may not be as great as the of Abrams'
depleted-uranium-laced protection.
The Leclerc has a sophisticated computer system, used, among other things, for
diagnostics, and it is capable of fitting into an IVIS-like command network. It also
features a positioning system that is updated as the tank moves, and the Leclerc is capable
of transmitting combat status and location. The Leclerc's composite armor is a modular
design, allowing for upgrades or changes in the armor recipe as new threats emerge.
[Ref.45: p.35] France has 420 and United Arab Emirates has acquired 338 AMX Leclerc
MBT and 46 armored recovery variants in a $3.6 billion deal in 1993. [Ref.48: p.22]
D. UNIT COST
Country Tank Quantity Deal Total Cost Unit Cost Total Produced
Saudia Arabia M1A2 315 1,800 5.7 8,670
Kuwait M1A2 218 1,200 5.5 8,670
UAE Leclerc 338 3,600 9.42 758
Oman Challenged 20 163 8.15 826
Total 891 6,763
Table 8. Different Tanks Owned by the GCC States and their Unit Cost
From the above table, the following conclusion can be drawn:
1
.
The unit cost of the MlA2 is the lowest among the other alternative tanks
2. If the UAE and Oman decided to acquire the M1A2 instead of what they have now,
UAE would buy 660 Ml A2 tank and Oman would get 30 for the same cost they have
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paid, i.e. $3,600 million and $163 million respectively. Or the UAE would pay
$1,850 million and Oman would pay $109 million, if they chose the same quantity of
M1A2, i.e. 338 ofMlA2 and 18 ofMlA2 respectively.
3. As the quantity of tanks increases, the unit cost decreases. The United States produces
a weapon system to cover the three U.S. services and foreign countries that are
interested in acquiring it. The European countries have relatively smaller militaries
than the United States. Also, the competition in Europe is less than that in the United
States. Therefore, the weapon unit cost for weapon produced in Europe is higher than
the equivalent weapon produced in the U.S.
4. In the case of having a GCC collective force, it will be very costly to maintain spare
parts for just 20 of the Challenged. It will be more economical if the 20 tanks were
M1A2. The 20 Challenged tanks require separate spare parts warehouses and
different support equipment. The Leclerc tank acquired by UAE is more economical
than the Oman tank case because it is almost the half of the quantity of the M1A2 in
the Gulf. But if the UAE tanks were M1A2, then it would be easy to build
consolidated support systems to serve the three forces, i.e. Saudia Arabia, Kuwait,
and UAE.
E. LOGISTICS CONSIDERATIONS
1 . The following table shows the quantity of tanks available in the six countries, type,
and the originating supplier. Tanks listed in the table are the active systems, which the
six land forces depend on as their main battle tank. Others not mentioned here are
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obsolete. The U.S. tank is dominant with total number of 1,182 tanks, France is
second with total number of 338, and UK has placed 20 tanks with Oman.
Saudia Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE Total
M60
USA 450 106 93 649
Ml








Source: Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf, June, 1998
Table 9. Type and Quantity ofMBT Available in the GCC States
In addition, the American tanks (Ml and M60) have a lot of things in common.
Some spare parts can be used in both tanks and both have similar logistic systems.
2. If the six countries acquire the same weapon systems, then they would require a
smaller logistics support system than if they depend on different weapon systems.
Consolidation always saves some money by optimizing the number of weapons to be
acquired. Instead of having 1,573 as shown in table, the GCC, as a collective, might
need a lower number as the logistics systems could help provide a higher operational
availability rate.
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F. M1A2 ACQUISITION THROUGH FMS BY SAUDIA ARABIA AND
KUWAIT
1. Choosing the M1A2
Saudia Arabia has long recognized the need for more modern tanks and sought
improved armor beginning in mid 1980s. Its goal was to develop a force using the Ml
tank. This offered not only one of the world's most effective weapons systems, but one
that could be finally supported and upgraded over time by the U.S. Army, which would
improve U.S. Army rapid deployment capabilities. Saudia Arabia faced major
uncertainties, however, over whether the U.S. Congress would permit such sales.
As a result, it examined alternative tank suppliers including Brazil, Britain, France,
and Germany. Saudia Arabia announced in February 1988 that it had selected the M1A1
and EE-T1 Osoro, built by Brazil, for some form of co-production in a purchase that
might involve some 315 vehicles and a $1 billion contract. One issue delaying the
decision to buy the Ml was whether the U.S. was willing to sell the M1A2 version of the
Ml, with a 120-mm gun. Another factor in a decision delay was that the Brazilian Osoro
existed in prototype form only, and production could not begin until 1 990 at the earliest.
Saudia Arabia eventually decided to buy 315 MlA2s in September 1989, although
the details of sale took roughly a year to complete because the U.S. Army had cut back
on its own orders of M1A2. The reasons for the Saudia decision, as well as the
complexity and sophistication of modern tanks becomes clear from an examination of the
Ml A2's performance characteristics.
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Saudia Arabia reaffirmed its commitment to this sale in late July 1992. Senior
Saudi sources indicated in September 1 992 that the Saudi Army would proceed with the
purchase of MlA2s to reach the total of 700 tanks. They indicated that Saudia Arabia
planned to cap its total tank force at 1,200 tanks, with 700 MlA2s and the rest M60A3s.
[Ref.3:p.39]
Kuwait held trials to choose new tanks in August and September of 1992. The U.S.
M1A2 seemed to have the advantage, with a top speed of 65 Km/h versus 50 for the
Challenged, superior braking, three hits out three at 2,000 meters versus one out of three,
1 hits versus eight at 4,000 meters, six hits firing on a slope versus two, and four hunter
killer hits in 32 seconds out of four fired versus three hits out of four in 66 seconds.
[Ref.49: p.31]
2. FMS Process
The foreign military sales process has been chosen by both countries to acquire the
Ml tank from the U.S. The.FMS process was same for both countries and it was
according to the U.S. regulations, starting with the Letter of Request (LOR) and ending
with the delivery schedule and follow-on support agreements. Although it was a major
transaction for both buyer and seller, and equally advantageous, the FMS process made
no incentive or concessions for such a large purchase. Like all FMS customers and all
FMS cases, both countries experienced the following problems:
1. Administration Surcharge: The three-percent surcharge cost is considered one of
the mains FMS disadvantages for valuable customers, such as Saudia Arabia and
Kuwait. The administration transactions are similar in any FMS case. What is
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different is the deal price on which the administrative cost is based. For example,
whether the deal costs $3 billion or $500 million, the FMS channel for both deals
would be the same. However, the administrative cost for the first customer will $90
million, while the cost for the second is $15 million. This differentiation certainly
makes valuable customers criticize the straight three percent rate for all customers,
regardless of the FMS case amount.
This flat percentage fee might direct valuable FMS customers to seek Direct
Commercial Sales. Saudia officials already have intimated to U.S. government and
industry officials that Riyadh may go directly to U.S. contractors for its next major F-
16 fighter and main battle tank purchases. Such a move would cost the government
more than $140 million in lost surcharges. [Ref.50: p.l]
There is a considerable debate regarding the three-percent surcharge, which is still
required between the customer countries and the U.S. Government. "The Saudia
Government had been complaining for years about FMS surcharges. They always
said they wanted a corporate rate in accordance with their size. But we had to explain
to them over and over that by law, we had to charge them. That's the way we had to
do business so that DSAA remains self-funded," Charles Brown said, a retired U.S.
Army lieutenant general and former head of DSAA. [Ref.50: p.34]
2. Bureaucratic Red Tape: Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, and all FMS customers always
prefer to procure U.S. weaponry through FMS because of the U.S. government
guarantees support, and because of the close military-to-military involvement that
comes with an FMS packages. However, the bureaucratic red tape, lax management,
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and a reluctance to adapt to market demands are beginning to choke the FMS
program. FMS is overly complex and confusing, especially where purchases of major
weapons systems are concerned. Policies and procedures are often poorly understood
by the DoD personnel responsible for carrying them out and so it is of little wonder
that the foreign customer becomes confused." [Ref.51]
The DSAA has been performing its transactions in a governmental directive
configuration, not like an international business. The directive configuration resolves
the tension between efficiency and effectiveness by configuring organizations for
optimal efficiency, while showing less concern of effectiveness and stockholder
collaboration. They avoid issues of adaptation and collaboration that force a
reexamination of current operations. Instead, they focus on maintaining internal
order, attempting as much as possible to cut the organization off from disruptive
external influences. Serving as the focus of decision making, general managers set an
organization's goals and make plans to ensure that all members act in concert with
minimal stakeholder input. They insist on formalized jobs and standardized work to
maintain orderly, reliable, and coordinated activity. [Ref.52: pp.7-8]
The purpose of the directive configuration is order. It describes an environment
that is stable, simple to complex, populated by machine bureaucracies that operate
best when disturbances are few. Machine bureaucracies maintain order by extending
their influence externally to minimize threats to their hegemony and by setting up
internal standard operating procedures and controls to ensure a smooth flow of
operations. [Ref.52: p.28] The directive way of doing work is efficient in a stable
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environment like the Cold War era. To continue the previous success, the DSAA
must seek management configurations suitable for international business in an
uncertain environment. The DSAA organization must be adaptive and flexible to any
changes in the world.
3. Congressional intervention: The FMS process consists of 30 days of Congressional
review to the FMS case. The Congress must give the green light to any arms sales, or
deny it. Even if Congress makes it decision on "day one," the customer must wait 20-
30 days to hear the result, a lag time which can severely impede its success with
alternate suppliers. The waiting period is especially difficult in times of emergency.
In the past, many requests from Saudia Arabia have been denied because the
Congress thought that this weapon would threaten Israel.
The Ml tank faced the same problem. There was a high possibility that the
Congress might block the sale ofM 1 tanks to Saudia Arabia. The impact of blocking
such a sale to Saudia Arabia might then block sales to Kuwait, too. Recent studies
proved that every $1 billion in FMS generates roughly 35,000 man-years of direct
employment for U.S. industry, and another 26,250 man-years of indirect employment
in surrounding communities. In other words, every man-year of employment directly
associated with the production of defense equipment for overseas sales creates an
additional 0.75 man-year of employment in the surrounding community. [Ref.53:
p. 84] If the sale of Ml tanks to Saudia Arabia, and as a result also the sale to Kuwait,
was denied by the Congress, then the following consequences would happen:
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• The amount of the two deals totals $3 billion, which means 105,000 man-
years of direct employment for U.S. industry and another 78,750 man-years of
indirect employment in surrounding communities.
• Every dollar in overseas sales that flows into the U.S. generates, on a national
average, another 96 cents for the communities in which defense firms are
located. Moreover, tax revenue generated for the federal government is
roughly 25 percent of the total income generated by overseas sales. [Ref.53:
p.84]
'
• Congressional denials of weaponry might affect the future relationships with
Saudia Arabia and other Gulf countries.
• The unit price of the tank would increase dramatically which, in turn, would
affect the future program of the tank. The experience of General Dynamics
was instructive. In the absence of significant foreign sales, GDLS contended
that by 1 993 it would have to shut down its Detroit, Lima, and Scranton plants
that produce the Ml. GDLS contended that the U.S. would face enormous
costs in reopening Ml production lines, once the plants were shutdown. By
GDLS's estimates, closing the plants would cost the government $200 million,
weaken the tank design and engineering community, and 1 5 percent of the
vendors involved in tank production would be forced out of business.
According to the company, it would take 48 months and anywhere from $500
million to $31 billion to restart the industry from a cold base. [Ref.54: p.57]
As a result, those additional costs would increase the unit cost.
4. Customer's Oversight: The FMS customers have nothing to do once they submit the
LOR, until they get what they require. The buyers mentioned are no longer willing to
tolerate the take-it-or-leave-it manner in which the Pentagon does business. For
example, the Pentagon cannot negotiate the terms and conditions of their purchases,
and does not allow customers to monitor disbursements or unexpected charges to
their accounts. [Ref.50: p.34] With major weapons programs, thousands of spare parts
and equipment are pushed on the customers, and often the customers have no clear
idea what is being delivered and how it relates to their system. [Ref.51]
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G. Ml TANK OFFSET - CO-PRODUCTION
GDLS has established in-country suppliers of components and subassemblies for
their products as part of the tank sale to U.S. Allies. These actions are taken on a sale-by-
sale basis. In Saudia Arabia, GDLS established a joint venture with AEC (Arabic
Electronics Company). This was a project by GDLS and Saudia Arabian investors to
establish a company capable of manufacturing electronic components for the tank. The
long-term goal was to grow the company from a supplier of military electronic units to a
commercial production house. Today, AEC is the largest Saudia Arabian supplier of
electronics components for AT&T in the Arabian Gulf region. Its commercial sales base
supersedes its military contract sales. [Ref. 55]
Another example is the establishment of a tank production plant in Egypt for the in-
country production of M1A1 tanks. The goal of the Government of Egypt and the United
States was a regional security arrangement that provided indigenous production of
armored vehicles for the Egyptian Army. A ten-year project among the U.S. Government,
GDLS and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense resulted in the design and completion of a
tank production facility in Egypt. GDLS manufacturing assistance teams worked with the
military ordnance department to increase the content of the 555 M1A1 tanks purchased
by Egypt. In the final years of the project, the Egyptian Tank Plant was producing and
assembling over 70% of the MIA 1 tank. They continue today to be a potential source of
components for M1A1 tanks when sold to other nations. The reasons for establishing
these business relationships (joint ventures and production plants) are to meet the security
interests of the U.S. and its allies fulfill offset requirements as a condition of the sale and
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provide the host nation an indigenous supply source. So the GD history is one of growing
local production and suppliers as a part of the sale of their military products. The size of
the non-United States suppliers and manufacturing base in each country is subject to
negotiation. [Ref.55]
The building or assistance of establishing a firm such as AEC, mentioned above,
has advantages which can be summarized as follow:
1. The offset agreement could be a tool to encourage countries to acquire a weapon
system from a particular country that offers the best offset. Saudia Arabia and Kuwait
have requested some offset from the U.S. The AEC is good example of that offset.
2. The AEC has participated in establishing the infrastructure of electronic industries in
Saudia Arabia. This step would indicate the possibility for further successes for such
projects in the Gulf region.
3. The manufacturing of the spare parts in country makes logistics tasks easier. Saudia
Arabia, in the case of AEC, has the ability to produce its parts needs domestically.
U.S. troops, located in Saudia Arabia, could get their needs from Saudia Arabia
without waiting for delivery from the U.S. The logistics shortage encountered by the
U.S. troops during the Desert Shield could have been solved if there had been a spare
parts facility in Saudia Arabia or any of the GCC states. As the Arabian Gulf area is
important to the U.S., the U.S. troops will remain in that area for long time.
Therefore, the need for spare parts to be available in the Gulf area is very important
for the U.S. as well as for the GCC militaries.
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4. Such in-county facilities can perform the depot maintenance domestically rather than
returning items to the U.S. Parts are sent from the GCC countries to U.S. for depot
maintenance, which is a significant cost. The availability of such in-country facilities
can perform this type of maintenance and save money and time.
5. In-country facilities can upgrade the weapon on-site. If there is a modification on the
tank in future, then the upgrading could be performed in Saudia Arabia.
6. Local parts and maintenance facilities would not be limited to the Ml tanks, but could
serve other weapon such as the M60A3.
H. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE M1A2 CASE
The M1A2 tank sales to Saudia Arabia and Kuwait were successful enough to be
used as an example for further military cooperation between the U.S. and different
countries around the world, especially the GCC. This FMS case could be used as a
guideline for the collective GCC countries' military to acquire their future weapons
needs, in order to reach their self-defense goals. The following points are extracted from
the MlA2 case with some recommendations suitable for the collective GCC as one unit:
1. The GCC states should come together and decide what weaponry they need to
acquire, discuss the available alternatives and choos the best for their need,
environment, and budget. This will increase the number of system sales and
eventually reduce unit cost.
2. The quantity of the selected systems should be considered in a consolidating manner.
This will make the system acquisition more economical and fulfill the required
cooperation among the six countries.
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3. The main goal for the six countries should be reaching high levels of interoperability
and standardization among the GCC and with the allied forces, especially the United
States and NATO. Since the U.S. always seeks such interoperability and
standardization with NATO, the U.S. weapon will fulfill this requirement.
4. The GCC should seek more direct offsets that directly relate to the system. The offset
project should be distributed among the GCC countries, according to the best location
in the Gulf to benefit or support the project.
The U.S., to remain in a position of arms export superiority, should improve its
foreign military sales program by discussing the following points:
One. Invite its valued friends and customers to participate in any new program at
the missions need statement discussion phase. This would encourage such
countries to participate in the program from the beginning and burden some
cost, especially the R&D, with the U.S. to get lower priced weapon systems in
the future. This would also minimize the cost of further modification for the
systems to make them suitable for the customers' environment.
c. Involve the Congress at the beginning of the program. The Congress decides
at that time which countries are eligible to acquire the system.
d. Discuss the FMS administrative charges and let the customers monitor those
costs. The three-percent charge does not help the DSAA cover its cost and
customers are not satisfied to pay considerable extra money just to do business
with the U.S. Government.
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I. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the FMS sale of the M1A2 tank to Saudia Arabia and
Kuwait for use as an example for further cooperation between the U.S. and the GCC
states. It demonstrates the benefits for the two parties in dealing with each other. Getting
powerful, economical, reliable, interoperable U.S. weapon systems is the key for GCC
self defense. Reducing the unit cost and supporting U.S. defense industries would be also
advantageous to the U.S.
The chapter identifies the disadvantages of the current FMS process to accomplish
such transactions. Although there is considerable competition from other industrial
countries, the U.S. FMS program has not changed to more business-like practices. For
FMS to facilitate the existing dominance of the U.S. defense industry, it has to perform in
an adaptive configuration and not in its current directive configuration.
Co-production is one way to attract more customers and to share the burden of cost
between different nations. It also assists in developing the industry infrastructure in the
Third World countries such as the GCC states. Lastly, the chapter lists some advantages




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION




The unity among the six GCC states is not strong enough for them to independently
defend themselves. A key factor needed to achieve such unity is weapon standardization
and interoperability among the GCC militaries. Because the majority of imported
weapons are American-made, Saudia Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait currently share a level
of standardization and interoperability which allows them to work as one military. Oman,
Qatar and the UAE need to follow suit. Based on the M1A2 tank, the U.S. weapon
systems appear to be the most suitable, giving the GCC militaries the required power and
mobility in order to defend themselves with autonomy. As oil prices decrease, the U.S.
weapons are the most affordable compared to other weapons from around the world.
Acquisition from stocks of existing weaponry is a short run solution for the security
of the region. The six countries have not exploited offset strategies for their high arms
expenditures during the last decades. All offset projects in the Gulf region have evolved
as civilian industries or civilian services, such as an electrical power station or civilian
aircraft maintenance. There is no offset agreement to create a weapons industry in the
Gulf. Implementing this strategy for future arms manufacturing would improve the self-
defensive capability over time.
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2. Recommendations
To reach the required level of unity, the GCC countries should discuss the
following points when they decide to acquire a major weapons system:
One. The six GCC states should coordinate their arms purchases to optimize their
efforts.
Two. The strategy of weapon system acquisition should place emphasis on the
total life cycle cost.
Three. By establishing defense industries through offset agreements, operational
costs will be reduced and, simultaneously, will minimize the weapon's life cycle
cost. For example, manufacturing spare parts for tanks or any other major
weapon will reduce the weapon's operational costs in the future and increase the
region's self-defending capabilities.
B. THE UNITED STATES.
1. Conclusions
The U.S. has been the largest arms supplier to the GCC, especially after the end of
the Cold-War era. However, this precedent is threatened by increasing competition from
other industrial countries around the world. The DSAA, which executes the arms
transfers from the U.S. to the recipient countries, should consider the following:
One. The DSAA has not changed its methods since the Cold War era, and
revisions are needed. The Cold War environment was stable and certain, and the
current environment is more unknown.
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Two. The DSAA deals with all customers in the same way, according to the
regulation, regardless of the dollar size of the customers' case. Customers like
Saudia Arabia, which is a major buyer of U.S. arms export, have been treated
like any other intermittent, low volume customer.
Three. The DSAA, by blindly applying the security assistance regulation, has
become an unresponsive organization. The customer has to initiate the arms sale
and negotiate the contract according to U.S. regulations. When the agreement is
reached, regulations must be followed without exception or deviation. This
unresponsiveness might cause some major customers either to shift from FMS
to DCS or to other arms suppliers' countries. Either way, the impact would have
a negative effect on the DSAA organization as well as the continuity of the U.S.
security assistance program and possible U.S. to GCC interoperability.
2. Recommendations
One. The DSAA should transform its management's configuration from a
directive organization to an adaptive organization. This will make the DSAA
more attractive in this competitive arena. A proactive approach would be to
participate in exhibitions to promote weapon systems to international customers.
Existing (off-the-shelf) technology could be demonstrated in military
maneuvers inside the U.S. or abroad. New weapons in the Concept Exploration
phase could be introduced to select countries, which would then have an
opportunity to share in R&D costs and eventually receive lower system unit
costs to the advantage of all parties involved.
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Two. The DSAA should encourage different arms programs that have benefits to
all parties, according to the sales situation. Particular cases might be handled
with FMS and some type of offset to motivate the negotiation to acquire certain
weapon system. While advantageous to the international buyer, offsets also
benefit the security assistance program and defense industries. The DSAA can
merge the FMS and DCS, capitalizing the available advantages and eliminating
the existing disadvantages in both programs. Applying both programs
independently perpetuates their disadvantages.
Three. The DSAA should coordinate between the different U.S. military services
(Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) and the U.S. defense industries in their
varied services to international customers. Such efforts would allow the DSAA
to find an optimal solution on a case-by-case basis and minimize duplicated
transactions in the system. Tighter control of DSAA administrative costs will
reduce those costs in the future, but may actually increase DSAA funding as
U.S. FMS becomes more attractive.
If the following proposed points were applied, the DSAA might become more
efficient and effective in future FMS cases:
One. Send their representatives to the allied countries to better understand the
customers' needs.
Two. Try to coordinate with the services in DoD, matching their needs with the
allied countries' needs, if possible.
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Three. Initiate and coordinate channels of communication between the DoD
services and countries that have similar requirements.
Four. Initiate studies and research to find the appropriate method of cooperation
between the U.S. and countries involved in FMS.
C. ANSWERING THE PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
What are the disadvantages of current arms sales process to the individual six
Arabian Gulf countries? How can the existing security assistance process be
improved to minimize the problems in the future, under the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)?
Some of the problems with arms sales to the individual six countries are listed in
Chapter II. However, the main disadvantage is lack of unified strategy. The individual
country purchase arms without the coordinated selection between the six GCC states. The
existing systems lack interoperability and standardization. Under the GCC, when the six
countries decide to acquire a major weapon system, the following steps are
recommended:
1. According to their security need, the six GCC states should select the appropriate
arms supplier that has the most affordable, reliable and most high-tech weapon system.
As discussed in chapter IV, the U.S. is one of those suppliers that have produced many
weapon systems which meet the above-mention criteria.
2. The required weapon system should be selected by coordination with the military
service in the supplier country. In case of the M1A2, the GCC states should coordinate
with the U.S. Army through the DSAA. This step might take two phases:
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• If the weapon system is off-the-shelf, then the effort should be concentrated on
how to modify the system to perform efficiently in the unique Gulf environment.
• If the required system is not available then the coordination should be
extended to include the U.S. military service if there are common interests. This
will encourage shared R&D cost, which leads to minimizing the system unit cost
for all participants' parties.
3. The six Gulf countries should coordinate among themselves to determine the optimal
number of systems required defending the Gulf region. The decision-makers should not
seek to acquire the total number requested by separate country actions. Instead, they
should focus on the overall quantity and consolidate resources in order to acquire the
most effective and efficient quantity, minimizing the administrative cost and burden.
4. The six GCC states might select the type of offset that is more practical for them. The
direct offset is the best practiced in two types of co-production. Production or assembly
of the system in the Gulf (such as the co-production of the M1A1 tank in Egypt) is one
form. The other option might be to produce some major spare parts for the chosen
weapon. The production of circuit boards for M1A2 by Saudi's Advanced Electronics Co.
as part of the M1A2 tank program is an example. This step will help to establish a
defense industry infrastructure in the Gulf. The six countries should choose, either in this
phase or later, the most appropriate country among them to build the required facility.
D. ANSWERS TO SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
1. How could cooperative co-production be implemented to improve the trade
relations between the U.S. and the GCC?
The relationship between the GCC states and the U.S. should not exist solely on the
issue of oil in the Gulf region. Currently, the U.S. needs the Gulf oil, and the Gulf states
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needs the U.S. for protection from threats. The trade between the two parties has
improved in many areas. Unfortunately, in the military arena, the roles are set with the
Gulf states as buyers and the U.S. as a seller. Although the Gulf states are important
customers to the U.S., they acquire only off-the-shelf weapon systems. Any further
industrial cooperation, such as the defense co-production, will definitely encourage other
areas of cooperation between the two parties.
2. What are the future possibilities for the GCC states to be defensively self-reliant
by producing arms with the help of U.S.?
As the oil prices gradually fall, the GCC states' ability to acquire new and high-
tech weapons will be reduced as well. One solution for this problem is to support the
future welfare of the Gulf States by building industry, especially defense facilities, to
reinforce the future of the GCC economy. In addition, the defense operations will
reinforce the future security of the region. With required defense industries in local
operation, then the GCC can control production under the available budget to meet its
regional security needs in the future.
3. Do co-production and cooperation affect U.S. defense preparedness, especially in
critical zones like the Gulf region?
The availability of defense industries in the Gulf would help U.S. forces in the
future in two ways:
• The modification kits, which are added to systems to perform efficiently in the
Gulf environment, could be manufactured in the GCC industries. The U.S.
forces might request such kits for their weapon systems only if they are
deployed to the Gulf area. Those kits would be supplied to the U.S. troops
after they had been tested in the Gulf environment by the Gulf military forces.
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• The available supply of spare parts and depot maintenance facilities near the
battle theater will reduce the lead-time for parts requests. It would not be
necessary for the U.S. forces to send their reparable items to the U.S. for
required depot maintenance. The local Gulf facilities could perform such
maintenance, as well as supply locally produced spare parts.
4. How will U.S. security assistance (and foreign military sales (FMS) as one of the
most preferable tools) reforms increase the level of foreign partnering on U.S.
weapon systems?
The current security assistance program is not flexible or reactive to international
changes in the political world or the arms market. This position has hindered the sale of
U.S. weapons which have been successfully fielded in the last decade. The most
significant difficulties with this system are the administration surcharge and
congressional intervention. Therefore, reforming the FMS program, by having reasonable
administrative costs and reducing congressional intervention, would probably result in
more countries encouraged to choose U.S. weaponry. With more of these international




1. Anthony H. Cordesman," Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, Challenges of
Security", CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, 1997.
2. M. E. Ahari," The Gulf and International Security, The 1980s and beyond": J.E.
Peterson, "Security Concern in the Arabian Peninsula", St. Martin's Press, 1989.
3. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Trend in the Military Balance and Arms Sales in the
Southern Gulf States After the Gulf War: 1990-1993", CSIS Middle East
Dynamic Net Assessment, (URL: http://www.csis.org), 1998.
4. Al-Qassim Waheed A.," Restructuring GCC Security Policy After the Gulf War,"
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1994.
5. Judd, W.,"A Reassessment of U. S. Strategic Interest in the Post-GulfWar Middle
East", 1996. ( http://www.is.rhodes.edu/Modus_Vivendi/Peak.html)
6. Steve A. Yetiv," America and the Persian Gulf, London, 1995.
7. Mary E. Morris," The Persistence of External Interest in the Middle East",
National Defense Research Institute, 1993.
8. Bernard Reich and LTC Stephen H. Gotowicki, U.S. Army, "The United States
and The Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration After the Gulf War", Royal
United Services Institute and Brassey's Defense Yearbook, 1992, London:
Brassey's (UK), 1992.
9. Major Jim Dart, USAF, "USMTM: Point Guard on the Arabian Peninsula", the
DISAM journal, winter, 1991/92.
10. Arm Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditure and
Arm Transfer, 1989, Washington, GPO, 1990; and Arm Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditure and Arm Transfer, 1993-1994,
Washington, GPO, 1995.
11. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1989-
1996, Congressional Research Services 95-862F, August 4,1995.
12. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA),"Foreign Military Sales,
Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of
September 30, 1994," Department of Defense, Washington, 1995.
13. Jane's defense Weekly, January 17, 1996.
103
14. Arm Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditure and
Arm Transfer, 1990, Washington, GPO, 1991.
15. Arm Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditure and
Arm Transfer, 1993-1994, Washington, GPO, 1995.
16. Anthony H. Cordesman, " The Military Balance in the Gulf
',
CSIS Middle East
Dynamic Net Assessment Project, URL: http://www.csis.org, May 5, 1998.
17. Michael K. Woodward, "An Analysis of the Impact of Offset Requirements on
the U.S. and Defense Industry", Master's Thesis of Science in Management, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1995.
1 8. Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis," Send Guns and
Money, Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy", Praeger, Connecticut,
1997.
19. Michael N. Beard, Lt. Colonel, USAF, "United States Foreign Military Sales
Strategy: Coalition Building or Protecting the Defense Industrial Base", Air War
college, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 1995.
20. Michael W. S. Ryan, " Assistance to the Persian Gulf Region". Edited by WM. J.
Olson, "U.S. Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region", Westview Studies in
Regional Security, 1987.
21. Draft Legislation Before the 103d Congress, the Peace, Prosperity, and
Democracy Act of 1994 (Washington DC, 1994).
22. Defense Institute of Security Assistance, "The Management of Security
Assistance", Fourteen Editions, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, February 1994.
23. Lora Lumpe," Clinton's Conventional Arm Export Policy", Arm Control Today,
May 1995,(URL: http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/articles/actmay95.html).
24. GAO, "Military Export: Offset Demands Continue to Grow", April 1996.
25. William Perry, "U.S. Military Acquisition Policy, Comparative Strategy", Vol.
13, Taylor & Francis: January-March 1994.
26. Jane's Analysis, "Middle East Contract Prospects Threatened as Oil Prices Slide",
Jane's Defense Weekly, 4 February 1998.
104
27. Jane's, " Gulf States Face Up To Changing Alignments", Jane's Defense Weekly
11 March 1998.
28. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Military Balance in the Gulf-Southern Gulf Forces
Overview", CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, (URL:
http://www.csis.org), 1998.
29. Richard F. Grimmett, " Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations
1989-1996", Congressional Research Services, the Library of Congress, The
DISAM journal, fall 1997.
30. Anthony H. Cordesman, "U.S. Global Arms Transfer", CSIS Middle East
Dynamic Net Assessment, (URL: http://www.csis.org), April 1998.
31. "World-Wide Conventional Arm Trade (1994-2000) A Forecast and Analysis",
The DISAM journal, spring 1995.
32. Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf: Saudia Arabia", CSIS
Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, (URL: http://www.csis.org), May5, 1998.
33. Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Gulf: Kuwait", CSIS
Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment, (URL: http://www.csis.org), May 5,1998.
34. Several references written by Barbara Opall, Defense News Staff writer, Defense
News Weekly.
35. Office of the inspection General "Foreign Military Sales: Administrative
Surcharge Fund", September 30, 1997.
36. Paul J. Hoeper, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense," International Armament
Cooperation for the New Millennium", The DISAM journal, fall 1997.
37. Meuschke, Karl R., "International Technology Transfer: A Case analysis of the
Multiple Launch Rocket System and the Patriot Missile System." Master's Thesis
ofNaval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. June 1996.
38. Dr. Louis J. Samelson," An interview with Mr. H. Diehl McKalip, Deputy
Director, DSAA", The DISAM journal, spring 1998.
39. Wes Glasgow, Colonel Christopher Cardline, and David Latson, "TheMlA2:
Current and Future Program Plans", Armor journal, May-June 1996.
40. Captain Todd Tolson," Building Tanks at Lima", Armor, November-December,
1996.
105
41. GAO, "Army's proposed Ml tank Overhaul Program", 1996.
42. Donald L. Gilleland,"MlA2: A Dominant Force On The Battle filed", Gulf War,
The Defense and Security Review, 1992 Edition, Atalink Limited, London.
43. The Defense And Security Review, "Conventional Weapons Prove Worth In
DESERT STORM", Atlalink Limited, 1992 Edition.
44. GAO, "Operation Desert Storm: Early Performance Assessment of Bradley and
Abrams", January 1992.
45. Jane's Armor and artillery, 1997-1998.
46. Tom Donnelly, "Overseas Producers Attempt to Close the Armor Technology
Gap", Army, September 1994.
47. Jane's Defense Weekly.
48. Ed Blanche, "Modified Leclerc On Test as Saudia Contest hots Up", Jane's
Defense Weekly6 August 1997.
49. Jane's Defense Weekly, March 28, 1 992.
50. Barbara Opall, Defense News Staff Writer, "Customers Abandon FMS; Cite High
Cost, Inflexibility", Defense News, February 9-15, 1998.
51. An interview with Col. A. Latif Al-Hindi from the Kuwaiti Liaison Office,
Embassy Of Kuwait, Washington DC, July 1998.
52. Robert, Nancy C, " Organizational Configurations: Four Approaches to Public
Sector General Management", Naval Postgraduate School, January 30, 1998.
53. Mr. William Bajusz and Dr. David Louscher, "The Economic Costs ofArms
Sales Curbs", the DISAM journal, winter 1988.
54. "Global Arms: International Operations of U.S. Defense Firms", the DISAM
journal, winter, 1991/92.







Defense Technical Information Center _ 2
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944









3. Professor David V. lamm, Code SM/LT 5
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
4. Professor Brad R Naegle, Code SM/Nb 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
5. Professor Keith F. Snider, Code SM/Sk 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
6. Isa Khalifa Abdulla Aljeeran 1
813 Daij Bin Hamad Ave
Muharaq 205, State of Bahrain
107





